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REMEDIES IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
SECTOR 
 
 
Alexandre de Streel * 
 
 
Published in D. Geradin (ed.), Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law 
vs. Sector-specific Regulation, Intersentia, 2004, 67-124. 
 
 
 
In 1987, the European Commission initiated an ambitious liberalisation program 
aimed to foster the emergence of a single EU telecommunications market securing the 
necessary critical mass for a dynamic telecommunications sector and improving the 
competitiveness of the European economy in an increased globalised world1. Thus the 
industry went under a fundamental restructuring process with lots of new operators 
entering in the market and existing players coming together through joint ventures and 
mergers. However, electronic communications are characterised by important 
economies of scale and scope, hence mere opening of the markets does not remove 
the prevalence of market power. The exercise of such market power had to be 
strongly controlled by public authorities because of risk that strong players would use 
their power to manipulate the restructuring process at their advantages and at the 
expense of the overall social welfare and because of the importance of the sector in 
economic and social terms2.  
 
To control such market power, public authorities may rely on three sets of legal 
instruments: (1) European competition law (ex ante mergers control and ex post 
prohibition of anti-competitive behaviours); (2) national competition law, which very 
often mirror European rules; and (3) national sector regulation transposing European 
Directives. Each set of instruments is applied by different institutions: European 
antitrust by the Commission (under the control of the Community Courts), national 
competition authorities (NCAs), national Courts, and in some countries the national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs); the national antitrust by the NCAs, the national Courts, 
and possibly NRAs; and sector regulation by NRAs (under the control of national 
Courts). 
 
This paper studies the remedies imposed under two of the three mentioned 
instruments and illustrates their convergence over time. After this introduction, 
                                                 
* European University Institute, Florence. This paper is based on joint presentation that I did with T. 
Shortall, while experts at the European Commission. However, any error remains mine and the paper 
does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission. It states the law as of 1 April 2004, unless 
stated otherwise. 
1 Communication by the Commission of 30 June 1987, Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green 
Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, 
COM(87) 290. 
2 On the economic situation of the European electronic communications sector and future challenges, 
see: Communication from the Commission of 3 February 2004, Connecting Europe at high speed: 
recent developments in the sector of electronic communications, COM(2004) 61; Communication from 
the Commission of 19 November 2003, Ninth Report on the Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(2003) 715; OECD, Communications Outlook 2003. 
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Section 1 reviews the antitrust practice of the Commission during this last ten years. It 
shows that the use of competition law has been very far reaching, such that some 
speak about a new (more interventionist and regulatory) competition law when 
applied to the electronic communications. Section 2 describes how sector-specific 
regulation controls market power (in particular the recently reformed Significant 
Market Power Regime). It shows how regulation integrates antitrust principles and 
evolves towards a ‘pre-emptive’ competitive law analysis. Bringing the previous 
sections together, Section 3 studies the convergence and the remaining divergences 
between antitrust and sector regulation. It shows that burden of proof to intervene and 
the institutions in charge are different and that as long as some particular features will 
be present in electronic communications, sector regulation will be applied as a 
complement to competition law. 
  
 
1. Remedies under European competition law3 
 
1.1. Overview of the system 
 
The main objective of antitrust is to ensure an overall economic efficiency4, and 
therefore its intervention is focused on the acquisition and the exercise of market 
power. Under European law, the main threshold for a competition authority to 
intervene is the presence of a level of market power equivalent to a dominant position, 
which has been defined as the position of economic strength which gives the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, consumers and 
ultimately consumers5. Competition authorities control market power, and when 
necessary impose obligations to undertakings, in two ways. First, they intervene ex 
post in a repressive way when anti-competitive agreements or abuses are committed 
(Articles 81 and 82 EC), and impose fines, behavioural or even structural remedies6. 
Second, they intervene ex ante in a preventive way when firms come together to form 
autonomous joint ventures or concentrations (Merger Regulation7). If the operation 
                                                 
3 Note that this contribution does not deal with Article 86 EC. For the application of EC Competition 
Law to electronic communications, see: A. Bavasso, Communications in EU Antitrust Law: Market 
Power and Public Interest, Kluwer, 2003; C.D. Ehlermann and L. Gosling (eds), European 
Competition Law Annual 1998: Regulating Communications Markets, Hart, 2000; J. Faull & A. Nikpay 
(eds), The EC Law of Competition, O.U.P., 1999, Ch. 11; L. Garzaniti, Telecommunications, 
Broadcasting and the Internet: EU Competition Law and Regulation, 2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003; 
C. Koenig, A. Bartosh and D. Braun (eds), EU Competition and Telecommunications Law, Kluwer, 
2002; P. Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, Hart, 2000; P. 
Roth (ed), Bellamy and Child: European Community Law of Competition, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2001, Ch. 14; J. Temple Lang, "Media, multimedia and European Community antitrust law", in B. 
Hawk (ed) Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1997, 377-448; H. Ungerer, "EU Competition law in the 
telecommunications, media and information technology sectors", in B. Hawk (ed) Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute, 1995, 465-519. 
4 C.D. Ehlermann and L.L. Laudati (eds), European Competition law Annual 1997: The Objectives of 
Competition Policy, Hart, 1997. 
5 United Brands 27/76 [1978] ECR  207, para 65; Hoffman-La Roche, 85/76 [1979] ECR  461. 
6 With the decentralisation Regulation applicable in May 2004, it is now clarified that structural 
remedies may be imposed in the context of an ex-post control: Article 7 of the Council Regulation 
1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Article 81 
and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. [2003] L 1/1. 
7 Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, O.J. [1989] L 395/1, as amended in June 1997. In May 2004, this Regulation will be 
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would create market power such that competition would be significantly impeded, the 
authority should block it or impose remedies to remove any competitive concerns. As 
merger control is mainly about market structure, structural remedies should be 
preferred8, but behavioral remedies may be accepted provided they have some sort of 
structural effects on the market9. 
 
The relationship between European competition law and other legal instruments is 
complex. European antirust applies across the board to all economic sectors, including 
electronic communications10. The fact that some markets are under the jurisdiction of 
specific regulation does not remove the jurisdiction of antitrust. Moreover, European 
competition law pre-empt national antitrust but also national sector regulation. NRAs 
should may not infringe antitrust when applying sector regulation and in case of 
diagonal conflict (between European antitrust and national sector law), the NRAs 
should even dis-apply sector regulation11. Thus, European antirust is a powerful 
instrument for the Community institutions (Commission or the Courts) to control 
national institutions. 
 
 
1.2. Assessment of market power in electronic communications 
 
(a) Market Definition 
 
As competition authorities control market power, their first task is to detect this power 
which has been defined by the economists as the ability to raise price above the 
competitive level12. Unfortunately, such market power can not be measured directly 
as the competitive price is unknown. Therefore, authorities assess the market power 
indirectly by relying on other observable indicators like market shares or barriers to 
entry. For the market shares to give any relevant indications, markets should first be 
appropriately defined to catch the boundaries of competition between firms. In 
antitrust practice13, a relevant market combines a product/service dimension with a 
geographical dimension. To determine both dimensions, the competitive constraints 
                                                                                                                                            
replaced by the new Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, O.J. [2004] L 24/1. 
8 Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation 4064/89/EEC and under 
Commission Regulation 447/98/EC, O.J. [2001] C 68/3. See also M. Monti, The Commission’s Notice 
on Merger Remedies, Speech 18.1.2002; G. Drauz, “Remedies under Merger Regulation”, in B. Hawk 
(ed), Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1997, 219-238. In general: F. Lévêque and H. Shelanski (eds), 
Merger Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law, E. Elgar, 2003. 
9 Gencor T-102/96 [1999] ECR II-753, para 319; Babyliss T-114/02 [2003] ECR II-1279, para 170; 
ARD T-158/00 [2003] not yet reported, para 193. 
10 Italy/Commission (British Telecommunications I) 41/83 ECR [1985] 873 
11 Van Eycke 267/86 [1988] ECR 4769; Ahmed Saeed 66/86 [1989] ECR 1839; Delta Schiffahrtsges 
[1994] ECR I-2517; Fiammiferi C-198/01 [2003] not yet reported, para 49; J. Temple Lang, 
“Community antitrust and national regulatory procedures”, in B. Hawk (ed), Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute, 1998, 297-334; J. Temple Lang, “Ahmed Saeed – National authorities must not approve 
practices or prices contrary to EC Competition law”, in M. Dony (coord.), Melanges Waelbroeck, v. II, 
Bruylant, 1999, 1539-1560; S. Martinez Lage and H. Brokelmann, “The application of Articles 85 and 
86 EC to the conduct of undertakings that are complying with national legislation”, in M. Dony 
(coord.), Melanges Waelbroeck, v. II, Bruylant, 1999, 1247-1295. 
12 S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law, 2nd Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002, 
Ch. 3; M. Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, C.U.P., 2004, Ch. 2. 
13 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition 
law, O.J. [1997] C 372/5. 
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(i.e. the demand and supply substitutions) that will discipline the firms’ behaviours 
should be identified with the so-called 'hypothetical monopolist test'. 
 
In electronic communications sector14, there are at least two main types of relevant 
markets to consider, that of services or facilities provided to end users (retail markets) 
and that of access to facilities necessary to offer such services provided to the 
operators (wholesale markets). Antitrust authorities should start by defining the retail 
product markets taking into account demand-side and supply-side substitutions. This 
definition should be primarily based on the respective needs of each customer 
categories (large, medium and small corporate customers as well as individuals) and 
not necessarily on the technology used. Clearly, customers needs and preferences may 
depend on specific technologies. For instance, fixed and mobile telephony are not in 
the same market because of the additional mobility feature offered by the latter15, or 
voice over Public Switch Telecom Network and voice over Internet Protocol may be 
in separate markets due to the additional quality of the former16. But as technological 
convergence takes place, consumers preferences are not any more linked to 
technologies. For instance, consumers may be indifferent to receive their broadband 
Internet connections via Digital Subscriber Line technologies over telecom copper 
pair or via cable modem over broadcast cable infrastructure. 
 
On the basis of retail markets definition, the authorities define the linked wholesale or 
intermediate product markets as the wholesale customers are -by identity- the retail 
suppliers: authorities have to determine the necessary service or the infrastructure for 
an operator to enter a specific retail market. For instance, if it is considered that 
Digital Subscriber Lines and cable modem are part of the same retail Internet 
broadband access market, then it could be deduced that, for that purpose, telecom and 
cable infrastructures are part of the same wholesale market17. At this stage, the 
consideration of  supply-side substitution is of the utmost importance for the markets 
should not be defined too narrowly. 
 
                                                 
14 See Commission Guidelines of 9 July 2002 on market analysis and the assessment of significant 
market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services, O.J. [2002] C 165/6, hereinafter Guidelines on market analysis, para 33-69. Up to now, 
the Court did not give many indications on the markets definition in the specific sector of electronic 
communications. In Endemol T-221/15 [1999] ECR II-1299, the Court of First Instance stated at para 
106 that the Commission enjoy a important discretion with respect to assessment of economic nature 
and consequently the Court’s review is limited and then endorsed the markets defined by the 
Commission in its decision Endemol I. Similarly in Cableuropa T-346/02 and T-347/02 [2003] not yet 
reported, the Court of First Instance noted at para 119 that the control of the Court is the one of 
manifest error  and then endorsed the markets defined by the Commission in its decision Sogecable/Via 
Digital. See also three studies made for the Commission services: Squire-Sanders-Dempsey and WIK 
Consult, Market Definitions for Regulatory Obligations in Communications Markets, July 2002; 
Europe Economics, Market Definition in the Media Sector - Economic Issues, November 2002; and 
Bird and Bird, Market Definition in the Media Sector: Comparative Legal Analysis, December 2002. 
Most of the studies cited in this contribution are available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/Study-en.htm>. 
15 This has been a constant practice of the Commission, see inter alia: Pirelli/Editizione/Telecom Italia, 
para 33.  
16 Communication from the Commission on the Status of voice on the Internet under Community law, 
O.J. [2000] C 369/3. 
17 In the U.S., some consider that DSL and cable should be part of the same relevant market: R.W. 
Crandall, J.G. Sidak, H.J. Singer, “The Empirical Case Against Asymmetric Regulation of Broadband 
Internet Access”, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 17, 2002, 953-987.  
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Turning now to the geographical scope of the market, it is used to be determined by 
the existence of legal and other regulatory instruments and by the area covered by the 
network18. Even if there is a tendency towards a Pan-European dimension of the 
markets due to the liberalisation and the harmonisation of technical standards and 
licensing procedures across Europe, the majority of electronic communications 
markets still maintain a national19 or even infra-national20 dimension.  
 
Some difficulties may arise due to the specific features of the electronic 
communications sector. First, the sector is characterised by externalities that may lead 
to very narrow market definition. For instance, in the European mobile industry, the 
prevalent tariff principle is the so-called ‘calling-party-pays’: the called party -who 
chooses the network which has to be called- does not have to pay for the call, whereas 
the calling party -who usually can not choose the network- has to pay for the call. 
There is a dichotomy between the person who pays and the one who chooses, or in 
other words, the called party imposes a negative externality on the calling party. It is 
thus plausible that the called network may increase profitably its termination 
charges21 because on the one hand, the calling network (and ultimately the calling 
customer) has no choice but to use the network of the called person, and on the other 
hand the called customer will not switch to another network as he does not pay the 
termination charge. Each network may thus be defined as a separate market with 
regard to wholesale termination22. Obviously, the market definition is an empirical 
exercise and others factors may constrain the pricing behaviour of the called network. 
For example, the person called may be sensitive the price to be reached (in case of 
close users groups or family and friends when the called party actually pays the 
invoice of the calling party), or there may be a choice between the different networks 
to be used (using call back or multiple SIM cards if available23). If these factors are 
present, termination may be defined more broadly and comprise all the mobile 
                                                 
18 See references in the Guidelines on market analysis, para 59. 
19 Markets have been considered national for call termination (Telia/Sonera, para 51), the local loop 
(Telia/Telenor, para 121); international roaming (Telia/Sonera, para 49). They have been considered to 
be national or covering linguistic region for broadcast transmission networks and the linked ancillary 
services (MSG Media Service, para 45; Nordic Satellite Distribution, para 71; DeutscheTelekom/Beta 
Research, para 23-24; BiB/Open, para 44). 
20 Markets for national leased lines may be narrower than national (possibly consisting of ‘larger 
metropolitan’ and ‘rest of country’ segments) given the geographically unequal development of 
competition in most Member States. On the other hand, markets for international leased lines appear to 
be at least European if not global (Commission Working Document of 8 September 2000on the initial 
results of the Leased Lines Sectoral Inquiry, p. 11). 
21 The termination charges are the wholesale charges that the calling network pays to the called 
network to terminate a call. For instance, if a customer of Vodafone calls a customer of Orange, 
Vodafone will pay to Orange a charge for the call to be terminated on the Orange’s network. 
22 Telia/Sonera, para 31. That is also the position adopted inter alia by the British regulator in 2001, 
and confirmed on appeal by the Competition Commission in 2003, see: Reports on references under 
section 13 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 on the charges made by Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-
Mobile for terminating calls from fixed and mobile networks, February 2003. The single network 
definition is not based, nor does imply, that mobile termination is an essential facility. Mobile networks 
do not have the characteristics of the essential facility as there are numerous in each country. In 
addition, the market failure related to mobile termination, i.e. negative externality, is not the same as 
the market failure related to essential facility, i.e. natural monopoly. In addition, the literature and case-
law on secondary markets is irrelevant here. Termination can not be considered as a secondary product 
because the customer does not pay for it. 
23 The call back means that the called party will call back the calling party on the latter’s network. The 
multiple SIM cards means that the mobile handset of the person called contains several SIM cards, 
hence several networks may be used to reach him. 
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networks of a specific country. But the general point is that market may be defined 
very narrowly due to the specific tariff structure.      
 
Second, electronic communications is a network industry, which implies that each 
product is geographically bound. In others words, there is a geographical aspect in the 
product dimension definition that should not be confused with the geographical 
dimension definition. The product definition may be based on the route to be 
followed, or on the network to be used. Ultimately, the route-by-route approach 
implies that every combinaison of two points (like the link between two telecom 
customers) is a separate product market. This has been adopted in some airlines 
competition cases24 because the time to travel is substantial and even the most 
frequent flyers do not fly more than several times a week. This approach makes less 
sense in telecom because the signals travel very quickly on networks  (hence a 
customer may be indifferent if his conversation is routed directly between London and 
Paris or have to go via Amsterdam), and the tariffs are usually averaged across 
different routes for economic and legal reasons25. Therefore, it is more appropriate to 
adopt an approach by network, possibly sliced according to the economic conditions 
to deploy its different parts (distinction between local and trunk segments)26.  
 
Finally, electronic communications are often characterised by high fixed sunk costs 
and continuous innovation. A benchmark price based on the marginal cost and a small 
mark-up (5 to 10%) as in the hypothetical monopolist test may be insufficient to 
recoup these fixed costs, and therefore would lead to an overly narrow market 
definition (and consequently a finding of market power where actually there is none). 
As put by Gual27, the benchmark and the mark up should generates sufficient 
revenues to cover fixed costs without leading to excess profit. Moreover, the sector is 
often driven by important and continuous innovation and the competition often takes 
place for the market instead of in the market28. The hypothetical monopolist test leads 
to a static measure of the degree of competition in the market and is a poor guide to 
dynamic competition, often more relevant in electronic communications. Again, it 
may lead to a too narrow market definition, or at least a too frequent finding of market 
power. 
 
                                                 
24 Ahmed Saeed, cited at note 11, para 40-41. 
25 Nevertheless, if these elements are not present, markets may be segmented on a route basis. For 
instance, international voice telephony services may be broken down by individual call traffic routes 
between any country pair (BT/MCI (II), para 19; BT/AT&T, para 84; BT/Esat, para 19; Commission 
Decision of 24 September 2003, UK/2003/6, UK wholesale international services). 
26 Product market may also be defined according to the geographical component of the customer 
requirements, which is related to the coverage, the quality, the pricing and the nature of the service 
under review. For instance, residential customers have low or average quality requirements that can be 
met by interconnecting different networks, hence they tend to be less sensitive to the network coverage 
of their telecom suppliers. On the other hand, business customers can be very sensitive to the quality of 
the call, hence pay a lot of attention to the network coverage under direct control of their suppliers. 
Therefore, the product market for large customers should be limited to large international networks, 
whereas the market for residential customers should encompass more geographically limited networks: 
P. Larouche, "Relevant Market Definition in Network Industries: Air Transport and 
Telecommunications", Journal of Network Industries 1, 2000, 419. 
27 J. Gual, Market Definition in the Telecoms Industry, CEPR Working Paper 3988, July 2003, p. 12. 
28 D. Evans and R. Schmalensee, Some economic aspects of antitrust analysis in dynamically 
competitive industries, NBER Working Paper 8268, May 2001. 
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If all these difficulties do not invalidate the use of antitrust principles in electronic 
communications sector29, they should be kept firmly in mind. In this sector more than 
elsewhere, authorities should ensure that market definition is only used as a mean to 
assess market power and not as an end in itself. 
 
 
(b) Measurement of Dominance 
 
Once the relevant market has been defined, the market power should be measured to 
determine if operator enjoy dominant position. A dominant position may be held by 
one firm (single dominance) or several ones (collective dominance). The assessment 
of single dominance30 is not an easy task that is limited to a review of an exhaustive 
check list, but requires a thorough and overall analysis of the economic characteristics 
of the relevant market to determine if one undertaking enjoys sufficient market power 
to behave independently. An important and starting criterion is the market share: 
below 25%, absence of dominant position may be presumed, whereas above 40%, 
dominant position may be presumed, both presumptions being refutable31. The market 
share should preferably be measured in value because telecom services are 
differentiated, and not in volume or with the number of lines or termination points32. 
Other criteria are also important33: overall size of the undertaking, technological 
advantage or superiority, absence or low countervailing buying power, easy or 
privileged access to capital markets, product diversification, economies of scale and 
scope, vertical integration, highly developed distribution network, absence of 
potential competition, barriers to expansion, or the control of essential facilities. 
 
The assessment of collective dominance is more complex and amounts to the case 
where two or several firms, which remain independent, behave as if they were only 
one dominant firm34. This parallel behaviour may be due to structural links (like 
agreements) between the firms, or to a market structure such that firms align their 
behaviours without any concertation or link (pure tacit collusion)35. In this latter case, 
markets should satisfy a number of characteristics like concentration, transparency, or 
retaliatory mechanisms. The Commission has already adopted several merger 
decisions where the concept of collective dominance has been applied to the 
electronic communications sector. For instance, it was considered that the 
characteristics of mobile telephony market in Germany and in Belgium36 may lead to 
                                                 
29 M. Monti, Competition and Information Technologies, Speech 18.9.2000. Commissioners’ speeches 
cited in this contribution are available on the European Commission website. 
30 Guidelines on market analysis, cited 14, para 72-82. 
31 Akzo C-62/86 [1991] ECR I-3359, para 60; Irish Sugar T-228/97 [1999] ECR II-2969, para 70. 
32 Guidelines on market analysis, para 76-77; Notice on market definition, para 53-55; Note from the 
Commission services/DG XIII of 1 March 1999, Determination of Organisations with Significant 
Market Power, available at <http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/SMPdeter.pdf>. 
33 Guidelines on market analysis, para 78. 
34 Guidelines on market analysis, para 86-106; Gencor T-102/96 [1999] ECR  II-753, para 276-277; 
Compagnie Maritime Belge C-395/96, C-396/96P [2000] ECR  I-1365, para 39; AirTours, T-342/99 
[2002] ECR II-2585, para 62. See also: P. Rey, "Collective Dominance and the telecommunications 
industry", in P. Buiges and P. Rey (eds), The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in 
Telecommunications, E. Elgar, 2004. 
35 C. Shapiro, "Theories of Oligopoly Behaviors", in R. Schmalensee, R. Willig (Ed.), Handbook of 
Industrial Organization V. I, North-Holland, 1989, 329-414. 
36 Respectively Vodafone/AirTouch, para 28 (the criteria to find collective dominance were: highly 
regulated market entry because licences were limited by reference to the amount of available radio 
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tacit collusion. But in general, few electronic communications appears to fulfil the 
conditions of collective dominance, particularly since the concerns about the 
likelihood of tacitly collusive behaviours by operators in setting bilateral termination 
charges have been abated by recent economic researches37. 
 
 
1.3. Remedies 
 
(a) Ex-post intervention: Abuse of dominant position 
 
Once market power has been identified, the antitrust authority may intervene ex post 
by sanctioning any abuse. In electronic communications, the Commission intervened 
mainly in two ways: first by issuing guidelines of general application explaining how 
it would apply antitrust if it were to open a case, and secondly by collecting 
systematic information on specific problem in the industry and on that basis opening 
individual cases. 
 
Since the beginning of the liberalisation, the Commission adopted three explanatory 
guidelines. In 1991 when the sector was only partially liberalised, the Commission 
issued guidelines38 dealing in a very general way with the application of competition 
rules to the telecommunications sector: application of ex ante control in the context of 
the restructuring of the industry, and application of ex post control to the agreements 
or unilateral conducts of the incumbents still enjoying monopoly rights on the 
majority of telecom services markets (and able to leverage their protected market 
power to newly liberalised markets).  
 
In 1998 when the sector was just fully liberalised, the Commission adopted a more 
focused Notice39 on the application of antitrust to infrastructure’s access, which was 
the most critical problem to ensure effective competition. This Notice listed the 
multiple behaviours that may be abusive, ranging from access’ refusal to access 
granted under unfair conditions. An outright refusal would be abusive in three cases. 
The two first hypothesis are relatively easy because access has already be given and 
either is withdrawn to the same firm (termination of an agreement) or is refused 
without justification to another firm (discrimination). The third hypothesis is more 
complex because access has not been granted and yet can be made compulsory in case 
of essential facilities. Under this doctrine40, a facility is deemed to be essential if its 
access is indispensable to enter the retail market because there is no actual alternative 
                                                                                                                                            
frequencies, and market transparency); and France Telecom/Orange, para 26 (the criteria were: 
behaviours parallelism for the previous four years and transparent pricing). 
37 M. Armstrong, “The theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection”, in M. Cave, S. Majumdar, I. 
Vogelsang (eds), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics v.I, North-Holland, 2002, 297-384; J.J. 
Laffont and J. Tirole, Competition in Telecommunications, MIT Press, 2000. 
38 Commission Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications 
sector, O.J. [1991] C 233/2.  
39 Commission Notice of 31 March 1998 on the application of competition rules to access agreements 
in the telecommunications sector, O.J. [1998] C 265/2, hereinafter Access Notice. 
40 J. Temple Lang, "Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies' Duties to Supply Competitors and 
Access to Essential Facilities, in B. Hawk (ed) Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1994, 245-313; J. 
Temple Lang, “The principle of essential facilities in European Community competition law – The 
position since Bronner”, Journal of Network Industries 1, 2000, 375-405; M.A. Bergman, "The role of 
essential facilities doctrine", Antitrust Bulletin, 2001, 403-434. 
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facility, even less favourable (no existing substitute), and it is not legally or 
economically possible to built an alternative facility (no potential substitute)41. In 
addition, granted access may be abusive if its conditions are anti-competitive. Prices 
may be excessive (when they bear no relation to cost)42, predatory (when they are 
below the dominant company's average variable costs, or below average total costs 
and part of an anti-competitive plan)43, or creating margin squeeze (when the margin 
between the access fee on the upstream wholesale market and the final price of the 
dominant operator on the retail downstream market is insufficient for a reasonable 
efficient service operator to make a normal profit)44. Conditions may also be 
discriminatory45, or amount to an illegal tie-in of two separate products46. 
 
Finally in 2000 at a time when high-speed Internet access was taking up in Europe, 
the Commission adopted an even more focus Communication47 dealing with the 
specific problem of the unbundled access to the local loop (in effect, compulsory third 
party access to the least competitive bit of the telecom infrastructure). It stated that 
incumbents should in general give access to their local loop under reasonable 
conditions to comply with Article 82 EC (in particular the essential facilities 
doctrine). However, this Communication was not effective enough to ensure the 
success of unbundling. The same issue was taken again in July 2000 under antirust 
with the launching of a sector enquiry, and in December 2000 under sector regulation 
                                                 
41 Ladbroke T-504/93 [1997] ECR II-923 para 131; Bronner C-7/97 [1998] ECR I-7791, para 41, 45, 
46; European Night Services T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94, T-388/94 [1998] ECR II-3141, para 208-
209; IMS Health C-418/01 [2004] not yet reported, para 52. 
42 General Motors 26/75 [1975] ECR 1367, para 12; United Brands, cited 5, para 251; Access Notice, 
para 105-109. See also: M. Haag and R. Klotz, "Commission practice concerning excessive pricing in 
telecommunications", Competition Policy Newsletter 1998/2, 35-38; M. Motta and A. de Streel, 
“Exploitative and Exclusionary Excessive Prices in EU Law”, in C.D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds), 
European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of Dominant Position, Hart, 2004.  
43 Akzo 62/86 [1991] ECR I-3359 para 69-74. Contrary to the US, no proof of recoupment possibility 
has yet been required by the case-law: Tetra Pak II C-333/94P [1996] ECR I-5951, para 144-149; 
Access Notice, para 110-116. The application of the Akzo criteria in multi-services industries may be 
problematic, as it has to be decided if the average variable cost (the benchmark under which the 
dominant firm could no go) should cover fixed costs and/or common costs. The Commission 
considered that the benchmark should be the long term average variable cost: Commission Decision 
2001/354, Deutsche Post, O.J. [2001] L 125/27, para 35. See further: T. Lüder, A new standard for 
predatory pricing, Speech 18.6.2002; D.E. Sappington and J.G. Sidak, “Competition Law for State-
Owned Enterprises”, Antitrust Law Journal 71, 2003, 479-523. 
44 Poudres sphériques T-5/97 [2000] ECR II-3755, para 178-179; Access Notice, para 117-119. See 
also: P. Croccioni and C. Veljanovski, “Price Squeezes, Foreclosure and Competition Law: Principles 
and Guidelines”, Journal of Network Industries 4, 2003, 28-60; M. Motta and A. de Streel, cited in note 
42. 
45 Differences may only be justified if the supply conditions are not the same (in particular different 
supply costs) or if the customers are not offering equivalent services, i.e. are not active in the same or 
closely related relevant markets: Corsica Ferries C-18/93 [1994] ECR I-1783, para 43; Access Notice, 
para 120-121 which clarifies that a discrimination may be abusive when customers are active on 
different but related markets (like mobile and fixed telephony).  
46 Hugin 22/78 [1979] ECR 1869; Hilti T-30-89 [1990] ECR II-163, para 118-119, upheld in appeal by 
Hilti C-53/92P [1994] ECR I-667; Tetra Pak II C-333/94P [1996] ECR I-5951, para 37 judging that 
tying may be abusive even where tied sales of two products are in accordance with commercial usage 
or there is a natural link between the two products. 
47 Communication from the Commission of 26 April 2000 on the unbundled access to the local loop, 
O.J. [2000] C 272/55. See also: T.C. Vinje and H. Kalimo, “Does Competition Law Require 
Unbundling of the Local Loop?”, World Competition 23(3), 2000, 49-80. 
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with the adoption of a Council and European Parliament Regulation making 
unbundling compulsory as of January 200148. 
 
Unsurprisingly, these three general guidelines were not sufficient to avoid any abuse 
from the incumbents. When alleged abuses were particularly harmful to the success of 
the liberalisation program or to European consumers’ interests, the Commission 
collected systematic information on incumbents behaviours and opened individual 
cases. Commission intervention may be arranged according to the market segment in 
which they took place: fixed narrowband and broadband, leased lines, mobile, and 
associated services. 
 
In the fixed narrowband segment, the Commission opened a case upon complaint 
against Deutsche Telekom in 199649. It considered that the new retail business tariffs 
of DT would (1) have price squeezing effects on new entrants when compared with 
wholesale interconnection charges, (2) discriminate in favour of business vis-à-vis 
residential customers, and (3) represent a bundling of services, some being under legal 
monopoly and others being open to competition. Thus, the Commission made the 
introduction of the new tariffs conditional to the allocation of two alternative 
infrastructure licences, the offer of access agreements at cost oriented prices and the 
separation of voice and Virtual Private Network services. In 1998, the Commission 
opened another case against Deutsche Telekom. It considered that DT’s fees for 
carrier pre-selection and number portability50 were excessive (in comparison with 
those charged in other Member States) thereby raising switching costs for final 
customers and impeding entry of new competitors. The file was closed when DT 
considerably reduced the fees (by 50% for carrier pre selection fees) and the German 
NRA agreed to take the case. 
 
In 1997, the Commission collected data among all dominant operators in Europe on 
the tariffs for international phone calls in order to determine if the underlying 
wholesale charges paid between operators (the so-called accounting rates) were cost-
oriented51. On that basis, the Commission opened in 1998 seven cases for excessive 
accounting rates. They were passed to the NRAs for them to impose substantial 
reduction in the prices (by an average of 27% in Finland, Austria and Portugal for 
example)52. 
 
                                                 
48 Regulation 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on 
unbundled access to the local loop, O.J. [2000] L 336/4. 
49 IP/96/543 of 25 June 1996; IP/96/975 of 31 October 1996. 
50 IP/98/430 of 15 May 1998. The Selection refers to the possibility for an end-user to rely on another 
operator to offer telephone services than the operator that provide the line connection, by dialling a 
short code of number. In case of pre-selection, the short code is registered in the end-user terminal who 
should then not dial the code. The number portability refers to the possibility for the end-user to keep 
her phone number when changing operator. 
51 IP/97/1180 of 19 December 1997. To do so, Commission compared these accounting rates with the 
national interconnection charges (using operators' rates and the EU best practice) plus additional costs 
specific to the international routes. 
52 IP/98/763 of 13 August 1998 with list the cases: OTE of Greece, Post & Telekom Austria, Postes et 
Télécommunications Luxembourg; Sonera of Finland, Telecom Eireann of Ireland, Telecom Italia, and 
Telecom Portugal; IP/99/279 of 29 April 1999. 
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In the fixed broadband segment, the Commission relied in July 2000 on the rarely 
used sector enquiry provision53 (which allows the Commission to enquire on a whole 
market rather than specific companies) to collect data on the provision of access to 
and use of the residential local loop. In March 2002, an external expert report was 
presented54. On that basis in April 2003, the Commission adopted the first 82 
condemning decision since the beginning of the liberalisation of the sector against 
Deutsche Telekom because of a margin squeeze between the wholesale price of the 
local loop (which was regulated by the NRA) and the retail prices. Later in July 2003, 
the Commission condemned Wanadoo (the ISP subsidiary of France Telecom) 
because of predatory prices in the retail market for Internet access. Unsurprisingly, 
both decisions55 have been appealed at the Court of First Instance due to the paucity 
of the case-law in telecommunications and the consequent many legal uncertainties. 
Finally, in December 2003, the Commission opened a case against TeliaSonera56 for 
predatory price in a bidding for the construction and operation of a fibre-optic 
broadband network for the provision of high-speed Internet access and other services 
on behalf of a regional housing association.  
 
In the leased lines segment, the Commission launched another sector enquiry in 
October 1999 because leased lines are an important building block of the information 
highways (as they are used by fixed new entrants and mobile telecom operators, 
Internet Service Providers and large business users). In September 2000, the 
Commission presented its preliminary assessment57. On that basis in November 2000, 
the Commission opened five cases for excessive international leased lines prices58 
because the control of the prices of international leased lines were not covered by the 
sector regulation59 (hence NRA could not act), and they were inherently of 
Community interest. These cases were progressively closed after significant decrease 
in the price of the international leased lines60. The Commission had also concerns for 
short distance leased lines (in terms of prices and services provisioning) but relied on 
the NRAs to act. The enquiry was closed in December 2002. 
 
In the mobile telephony segment, the Commission collected in 1998 systematic 
information on the high prices for fixed to mobile and mobile to fixed calls61. On that 
                                                 
53 Article 12 of the Council Regulation 17/62, as carried over by Article 17 of the Decentralisation 
Council Regulation 1/2003. 
54 IP/00/765 of 12 July 2000. Report done by Squire-Sanders-Dempsey, Legal Study on Part II of the 
Local Loop Sectoral Inquiry, February 2002, available at 
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/local_loop/>. 
55 R. Klotz and J. Fehrenbach, “Two Commission decisions on price abuse in the telecommunications 
sector”, Competition Policy Newsletter 2003/3, 8-13. Note also that in March 2004, the Commission 
settled another case with Deutsche Telekom without adopting a formal decision, regarding a price 
squeeze between wholesale price for line sharing and retail prices: IP/04/281 of 1 March 2004. 
56 IP/03/1797 of 19 December 2003. 
57 IP/99/786 of 22 October 1999; Commission services Working Document of 8 September 2000 on the 
initial results of the leased lines sector inquiry,; IP/00/1043 of 22 September 2000; IP/02/1852 of 11 
December 2002. 
58 Against the incumbents of Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain: W. Sauter, The Sector 
Inquiries into Leased Lines and Mobile Roaming: Findings and follow-up, Speech 17.9.2001. 
59 In particular, the Directive 92/44 as amended. 
60 Average price decrease of 30 to 40% for the 2Mbits lines, the most commonly used bandwidth: 
IP/02/1852 of 11 December 2002. 
61 IP/98/1036 of 26 November 1998. In the case of mobile-to-fixed calls, the fixed termination charge 
is the fee paid by the mobile operator to the fixed operator for terminating the call. In case of fixed-to-
mobile calls, the mobile termination charge is the fee paid by the fixed operator to the mobile operator 
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basis, cases were opened for excessive fixed termination charges62, excessive fixed 
retention charges63, and excessive mobile termination charges64 The cases were 
passed to NRAs when they had jurisdiction to intervene under national 
telecommunication law, and otherwise were closed after the operators agreed 
substantial reduction of their charges (from 30 to 80%)65. The particular issue of 
excessive mobile termination charges came again in 2002 in the Netherlands when the 
Commission opened a case against the incumbent KPN following a complaint of 
WorldCom. However this time, the Commission decided to tackle the case under 
constructive refusal to access to KPN mobile network, margin squeeze between 
mobile termination charges and retail prices offered to VPN customers and 
discrimination on the mobile termination charge in favour of KPN66. It did not rely on 
the (supposedly more difficult to prove) unfair pricing abuse. 
 
Again in the mobile sector, the Commission launched in January 2000 another sector 
enquiry on the high international roaming prices67. In November 2000, the 
Commission presented its preliminary findings and identified several possibilities of 
excessive prices (on the basis of discrimination, benchmarking, and an analysis of the 
pattern of changes of the price over a four years period). Moreover in July 2001, the 
Commission carried out dawn raids at the premises of nine mobile operators in the 
UK and Germany, and had thought at some point to open cases for excessive price 
exercised by collective dominant operators. However, no formal case has been opened 
yet. 
 
Finally in the associated services segment, the Commission68 sent in 1995 a statement 
of objection against Belgacom because of unfair prices related to access to 
subscribers’ data for the publication of telephone directories (which had the effect to 
exclude competitors on the directory market). After a detailed cost analysis, 
Belgacom settled the case with the Commission in 1997, and agreed to substantially 
reduce its tariff (by more than 90% of the original price). 
 
 
(b) Ex-ante intervention: Control of mergers and joint ventures 
                                                                                                                                            
for terminating the call, and the fixed retention charge is the fee kept by the fixed operator for 
originating the call. 
62 Four cases: Deutsche Telekom, KPN of the Netherlands, Telefonica of Spain, Telecom Italia: 
IP/98/707 of 27 July 1998. 
63 Eight cases: Belgacom of Belgium, Telecom Eireann of Ireland, Deutsche Telekom, KPN of the 
Netherlands, Telefonica of Spain, Telecom Italia, BT, P&T Austria: IP/98/707 of 27 July 1998. 
64 Cases opened in two countries: all the mobile operators in Germany and in Italy: IP/98/141 of 9 
February 1998; IP/98/707 of 27 July 1998. 
65 IP/98/1036 of 26 November 1998; IP/99/298 of 4 May 1999. 
66 IP/02/483 of 27 March 2002. The case is still pending at the Commission. 
67 IP/00/111 of 4 February 2000; Commission services Working Document of 13 December 2000 on 
the initial findings of the sector inquiry into mobile roaming charges; MEMO/01/262 of 11 July 2001. 
Note that in 1997, the Commission gave its approval in a comfort letter to the GSM MoU standard 
international roaming agreement, whose some clauses may be the source of the current concerns: 
XXVIIth Commission Report on Competition Policy 1997, p. 139. International roaming tariffs are the 
charges that a mobile customer has to pay while giving and receiving call abroad using another 
network that the one to which he is affiliated. 
68 IP/97/292 of 11 April 1997; ITT Promedia/Commission T-111/96 ECR [1998] II-2937. See also: P. 
Richards, “Competition issues on access to databases for the provisions of directory information 
services in the EU”, Telecommunications Policy 27, 2003, 563-583. 
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In case of market power, the Commission may intervene ex post to prohibit anti-
competitive abuse, but it may also intervene ex ante to control mergers and joint 
ventures. In electronic communications, this second possibility has been used much 
more extensively than the first for several reasons. First, the Commission was faced 
with numerous notifications of alliances as the industry went under massive 
restructuring69. Second, the Commission adopted a more interventionist stance in 
electronic communications than in other sectors. As shown in Table 1 of the Annex 
which listed all cases adopted under the Merger Regulation, the rate of remedies 
decisions in electronic communications (9.8%) is higher than the average (7.5%). The 
difference is even more striking for prohibitions decision (2.5% instead of 0.7%, in 
particular in the media sector. Yet, most of the cases have been cleared without the 
imposition of any remedy. Indeed, from 1990 to 2003, the Commission adopted only 
23 remedies decisions and 6 prohibitions, out of a total of 236 decisions. 
 
In the remaining part of this section, the main decisions adopted under the Merger 
Regulation and also those adopted under Article 81 EC are presented according the 
market segment (listed in Tables 2 and 3)70. 
 
Fixed segment 
 
In the mid-nineties, the European incumbents notified to the Commission several 
alliances between themselves and with US operator to provide global telecom 
services. Three clusters of ventures were concluded. The first was initiated in 1994 by 
BT (not surprisingly as the UK was the first Member State to liberalise its market), 
which joined the American long distance company MCI to set up the Concert venture 
for the provision new international value added telecom services for large 
multinationals. In Concert, the Commission had concerns on the market for global 
telecom services as BT and MCI were potential competitors on that market. However, 
the venture was exempted for some years with very light conditions because Concert 
would be able to offer better global services than either BT or MCI alone, the venture 
would face significant competition from strong players, and the existing telecom 
regulation to which BT and MCI were subject in their own countries would prevent 
cross-subsidisation and discrimination in favour of the joint venture. Later this deal 
was abandoned following WorldCom’s successful take-over bid over MCI, and BT 
turned in 1999 to the other long distance American operator AT&T to create a joint 
venture (again branded Concert) to provide global telecom services to multinationals 
and international carriers services to other telecom companies. In BT/AT&T, the 
Commission did not any more had concerns for the competition on the global telecom 
services because of the increase competition on international route and the increased 
regulation of the last mile infrastructure. It had only concerns for the co-ordination of 
                                                 
69 P. Curwen, “Formation and development of international alliances” in G. Madden (ed), International 
Handbook of Telecommunications Economics V. III, E. Elgar, 2003; G. Le Blanc and H. Shelanski, 
“Telecommunications Mergers in the EU and US: A Comparative Institutional Analysis”, in F. 
Lévêque and H. Shelanski (eds), cited at note 8, 172-207. 
70 For a full description of all the cases, L. Garzaniti, cited at note 3, Ch. VIII. Note that until the 
amended Merger Regulation entered into force in March 1998, its scope was narrower, hence the scope 
of Article 81 EC broader: all joint ventures, even the full function autonomous ones, that had the object 
of effect to co-ordinate the competitive behaviours of the parents fall under Article 81. This explains 
why the joint ventures set up between incumbents during mid-nineties to provide global telecom 
services were analysed under Article 81 EC. 
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the behaviours of the parents BT and AT&T on neighbouring markets than those 
where Concert would be active (mainly several UK telephony markets). To exclude 
any risk of co-ordination, AT&T undertook to divest some of its UK assets (like ACC 
UK providing long distance telecom services). The venture broke up again in 2001 
and the Concert assets were divested back to its parents. 
 
The second strand of alliances was reflecting the Franco-German couple, where 
France Télécom and Deutsche Telekom set up in 1996 the Atlas venture to provide 
non reserved –at that time- global telecom services to large users in Europe. In 
parallel, Atlas and Sprint from the US notified the Phoenix/Global One venture, 
which was an extension of Atlas services world-wide. In its twin decisions Atlas and 
GlobalOne, the Commission had concerns on the market for global telecom services 
as FT and DT were potential competitors and could use their dominance in national 
markets to favour the venture. These alliances was exempted for five and seven years 
under much more stringent conditions than Concert due to the different regulatory 
context71: France and Germany (at the time, the major shareholder of FT and DT) 
undertook to liberalise alternative infrastructures to make Atlas' competitors less 
dependant of the networks of its parents; the parties agreed to postpone the transfer of 
their domestic data transmission networks to Atlas pending full liberalisation of 
French and German infrastructures and, in addition, took several behavioural 
commitments (no discrimination or cross-subsidisation in favour of Atlas, no 
exchange of confidential information, no tying and use of separate analytical 
accounts). Three years later in 1999, the Commission intended to remove some 
obligations and allow GlobalOne to provide all telecom services (including voice 
telephony), due to the market developments and in particular the entry of substantial 
competitors such as the BT/AT&T venture72. Later on, the deal was abandoned and 
Global One network was merged with the one of Equant, solely controlled by FT. 
 
The third strand of incumbents alliance was the Unisource venture in 1997 between 
Telia from Sweden, KPN from the Netherlands and Swiss Telecom to provide mobile, 
satellite, data and corporate services on a global basis. In parallel, Unisource and 
AT&T notified the Uniworld venture, which was an extension of Unisource services 
world-wide. In its twin decisions Unisource and Uniworld, the Commission granted 
an exemption for five years after the parties took similar commitments than those 
imposed in Atlas. Four years later in 2001, the Commission repealed in Unisource II 
all the obligations previously imposed following the reduction of Unisource's scope to 
valued added services to multinationals, the increased competition on the markets, 
and the additional regulatory safeguards in the Netherlands and Sweden. 
 
However, these alliances were limited to new international services and in fact have 
been very unstable over time, as most of the initial deal have been abandoned by now. 
They did not match the objectives of the Commission when liberalising the market, 
i.e. the creation of fully integrated pan-European group. The first of these more 
ambitious operations took place only in the 1999, when Telia decided to merge all its 
activities with Telenor of Norway in a deal of 47 $bn. In Telia/Telenor, the 
                                                 
71 Contrary to the UK, at the time of the notification, telecom and alternative infrastructures were not 
yet liberalised in France and Germany and telecom regulators were in their infancy. 
72 XXIXth Commission Report on Competition Policy 1999, Global One II, p. 141. However, the 
Commission did not intend to review the conditions relating to the behaviour of the parent companies 
(like the requirements not to cross-subsides or discriminate in favour of GlobalOne). 
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Commission had concerns on several Swedish and Norwegian markets for telecom 
services and for television services73 because of the loss of potential competition and 
the possibilities of the merging entity to foreclose entry by raising rival costs (with 
increase of interconnection tariffs) and bundling products across a wider geographical 
area. The Commission only approved the merger after the parties agreed to divest any 
overlapping telecom interests and their cable TV activities. Moreover, the Swedish 
and Norwegian governments (which were the major shareholders of the merging 
parties) committed to implement local loop unbundling in their countries, which was 
then imposed on 1 January 2001 on a more general basis in all Members States. 
However, due to a disagreement between the boards of directors of the parties, the 
deal was abandoned. 
 
Two years later in 2002, Telia turned to Sonera of Finland to integrate their activities. 
In Telia/Sonera, the Commission considered that the merger would strengthen the 
dominant position on several Finnish and Swedish telecom markets74 because of 
overlapping activities, loss of potential competition and the possibility to leverage 
market power from the mobile and fixed markets. Therefore, the Commission only 
cleared the merger after the parties agreed to divest any overlapping business (mobile 
and WLAN activities of Telia in Finland) and their cable TV in Sweden. In addition 
as the unbundling was not very successful to alleviate leverage from the local loop to 
other telecom markets, the Commission went further than in Telia/Telenor and 
imposed a legal separation between the operation of networks and services of their 
fixed and mobile activities in Sweden and in Finland, as well as a non discriminatory 
access to fixed and mobile termination for three years with a fast track dispute 
resolution procedure75. 
 
In parallel of this European consolidation, the big American Internet companies were 
also restructuring themselves, in particular under predator WorldCom. In 1998, it 
merged with MCI, a deal of 40 $bn. In WorldCom/MCI, the Commission was 
concerned that merging firms would control a critical mass (more than 50%) of the 
market for the provision of ‘top-level’ or ‘universal’ Internet connectivity so that they 
would be able to secure and reinforce their dominant position through network effects 
and quality degradation. Indeed once a network reaches a certain size or if there is a 
marked disparity between it and other networks, it grows further because it may have 
incentives and possibilities to offer its customers a better and more varied services76. 
The merger was cleared on the conditions that the MCI’s Internet network would be 
divested. The network was sold to Cable & Wireless, but with many problems due to 
the high integration between Internet and non-Internet business of MCI77. Two years 
                                                 
73 Telecom markets: fixed switched telephony, PABX distribution, mobile telephony, Internet access, 
and local telephone directories; and media markets: wholesale rights to content, content buying, 
satellite transponder capacity, technology for scrambling and unscrambling of TV signals, retail 
distribution of TV services. 
74 Finnish markets (mobile services, international roaming and WLAN) due to the overlapping 
activities of the parties, and on the Swedish and Finnish markets (for fixed international calls, fixed 
termination, mobile services, international roaming and mobile termination, and business data 
communications) 
75 The remedies were accepted by the Commission on 19 May 2003: IP/03/702. 
76 J. Crémer, P. Rey and J. Tirole, “Connectivity in the commercial Internet”, Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 2000/4, 433-472. 
77 See the testimony of the CEO of Cable & Wireless M. McTighe before the Commerce Committee of 
the US Senate on 8 November 1999.  
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later in 2000, WorldComMCI wanted to absorb the other US operator Sprint. In 
WorldComMCI/Sprint, the Commission considered again that the merger would 
create a dominant position in the market for top-level universal Internet connectivity. 
Due to the problems of the previous MCI’s Internet business divestiture, the 
Commission considered that the parties proposal to divest Sprint’s Internet business 
was insufficient, and in agreement with the US competition authorities prohibited the 
merger. 
 
Thus, in its appraisal of the early global telecom services joint ventures, the 
Commission tried to reach a delicate balance by exempting the alliances as they 
permitted global services to be offered more quickly, and imposing severe conditions 
to alleviate any leveraging from the control of basic infrastructure into the emerging 
markets of global telecom services. In practice, as the Commission noted78: 
 
The Commission is favourably disposed towards this process of adjustment. Such 
restructuring is on the whole necessary if firms are to benefit fully from liberalization, 
carry out the necessary research and development, launch new services and reduce 
costs. On the other hand, the liberalization process must not be called into question by 
restructuring operations which would have the effects of perpetuating excessive price 
levels, preventing new companies from entering previously monopolistic markets, or 
any other abuse or strengthening of a dominant position. Competition policy as it 
relates to the information society is therefore a balance between, on the one hand, a 
liberal attitude towards restructuring and, on the other, the need to keep a watchful 
eye on how such restructuring is carried out, or even impose a ban in some case; 
There is also a link between the degree of actual liberalisation of the relevant markets, 
which evolves over time, and the conditions which may be attached to restructuring 
operations. 
 
For full mergers between incumbents, the Commission had to reach a similar balance. 
It favoured such mergers as enhancing the internal market but feared that they would 
create or strengthen dominant position in several telecom and media markets because 
of overlapping activities, loss of potential competition, and possibility of leveraging 
the dominant position in the home country of one incumbent to increase market power 
in the home country of the other merging incumbent. Thus such mergers were cleared 
under very stringent conditions: divestiture of any overlapping business, divestiture of 
cable TV in order to stimulate infrastructure competition, and third party access to 
telecom infrastructure (with additional conditions ensuring compliance) to stimulate 
service and infrastructure competition. 
 
Mobile segment 
 
Even though the mobile industry developed under different and much more 
competitive conditions than the fixed industry, it went also under a heavy 
restructuring process at the end of the nineties, mainly under the English predator 
                                                 
78 XXVIth Commission Report on Competition Policy 1996, para 66; and Commission Guidelines of 
1991, cited at note 38, para 129-138. See further: P. Larouche, “EC competition law and the 
convergence of the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors”, Telecommunications Policy 22, 
1998, 219-242; M. Pena Castellot, " The application of competition rules in the Telecommunication 
sector: Strategic Alliances", Competition Policy Newsletter, 1995/4, 1-6; M. Styliadou, "Applying EC 
competition law to alliances in the telecommunications sector", Telecommunications Policy 21, 1997, 
47-58. 
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Vodafone. In 1999, Vodafone acquired the US mobile operator AirTouch in a deal of 
74.7 $bn. In Vodafone/AirTouch, the Commission had concerns on the German 
mobile market because the merging entity would have had interest in two of the main 
three German mobile operators (D2 partially owned by AirTouch and E-Plus partially 
owned by Vodafone) which would have led to a duopolistic market situation 
amounting to a collective dominant position. Thus, the merger was cleared under 
condition that E-Plus was divested (sold to BellSouth and then to KPN). One year 
later in 2000, the British predator continued its expansion and in the most important 
concentration between mobile operators (amounting to 180 $bn), acquired the 
German Mannesmann. In Vodafone/Mannesmann, the Commission had concerns on 
three markets: creation of dominance in the English and Belgian mobile markets 
because of the overlapping activities; and creation of a dominant position on the 
emerging market for seamless pan-European mobile services to corporate customers 
because of the footprint of the parties in most of the European countries and their 
ability to integrate their national mobile networks to develop pan-European services. 
The merger was cleared on conditions that Orange (operating on UK and Belgium) 
was divested, and third party access was granted for three years on a non-
discriminatory basis to their integrated networks (wholesale services like 
interconnection and roaming) with a fast track dispute resolution procedure. 
 
Next to the industrial consolidation, the other major event of the mobile sector was 
the introduction of the third generation (3G or UMTS) mobile services which 
provides a much higher data transmission capacities than the previous second 
generation (2G or GSM). This new technology is very promising, but its roll-out has 
been much slower than expected79 due to the financial difficulties of the sector, the 
huge sums paid in getting the spectrum licences and the delay of the equipment 
manufacturer. To save costs and ensure a quicker roll-out of 3G services, several 
operators decided to joint their forces by sharing some parts (like the masts) of a 
network built together or by concluding national roaming agreement (such that one 
party built the network and the customers of the other party may use this network to 
give and receive their calls). Thus, T-Mobile of Deutsche Telekom and mmO2 of BT 
entered into agreements to share site and to roam on their 3G networks in the UK and 
Germany. In its 2003 twin decisions UK Network Sharing  and Network Sharing 
Rahmenvertrag80, the Commission considered that site sharing did not restrict 
competition because the part of the network to be shared were limited to basic 
infrastructure such as masts and power supply not involving network intelligence part. 
On the other hand, it considered that national roaming restricted network-based 
competition, but may be exempted for some years (4 to 5 years depending of the 
areas) because it was limited to less economic areas (like rural or small cities) where 
it led to better and quicker 3G coverage.  
 
 
Content-related segment 
 
                                                 
79 Communication from the Commission of 11 June 2002, Towards the Full Roll-Out of Third 
Generation Mobile Communications on 3G, COM (2002)301. 
80 D. Gabathuler and W. Sauter, “Network sharing in 3rd generation mobile telecommunications 
systems: minding the coverage gap and complying with EC competition rules”, Competition Policy 
Newsletter 2003/3, 43-46. 
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The third broad segment of the electronic communications sector involves 
infrastructure and content, which is more politically sensitive as it touches upon 
pluralism and cultural diversity. After two early ventures that were famous as they 
were blocked, mainly two streams of ventures have been notified to the Commission; 
first, alliances relating to the TV to develop new digital pay-TV platform and 
emerging advanced interactive digital TV services81, and second alliances relating to 
Internet. 
 
The two early ventures took place in the Netherlands and in Scandinavia. RTL (from 
the broadcasting Group CLT), Veronica (a Dutch commercial broadcaster) and 
Endemol (the largest independent producer of TV programmes in the Netherlands) set 
up the venture Holland Media Groep to pack and broadcast television programme. In 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol I, the Commission considered the alliance would create 
dominance on three markets (free-to-air broadcasting, TV advertising, and 
independent production) because of the broad range and the vertical links of the 
venture’s activities. The transaction was prohibited in 1995 as no sufficient remedies 
were proposed. The parties appealed the decision at the Court of First Instance 
because they had already implemented the concentration at the time of the 
prohibition, and in 1999, the Court confirmed the Commission decision. In the 
meantime, the parties also modified their transaction as Endemol withdrew from the 
venture and got the approval of the Commission in 1996 in RTL/Veronica/Endemol II. 
In Scandinavia, Norsk Telecom (with interest in cable, satellite capacity, and pay-TV 
operation), TeleDenmark (Danish telecom incumbent, with the largest cable capacity 
in its country), and Kinnevick (a Swedish conglomerate, which is the most important 
provider of Nordic satellite TV programmes and a major pay-TV distributor) set up 
the Nordic Satellite Distribution venture to transmit satellite TV programmes in the 
Nordic region. In Nordic Satellite Distribution, the Commission found that venture 
would create a dominant position on three markets (transponder capacity for TV 
broadcasting to the Nordic region, the Danish cable market, satellite pay-TV channels 
distribution) because the vertically integrated nature of the operation would have 
allowed the parties to foreclose the Nordic satellite TV markets. The merger was 
blocked in 1995 as no suitable remedies were proposed. 
 
As regard to the stream of alliances related to digital TV, the first venture took place 
in Germany. In 1994, Bertelsmann and Kirch (two media group controlling the main 
pay TV Premiere) and Deutsche Telekom formed the Media Service GmbH venture to 
provide technical and administrative handling of pay TV services (for instance the 
management of the set-top boxes). In MSG Media Service, the Commission had 
concerns on three markets: MSG would acquire a dominance on administrative and 
technical pay-TV services because it would be the first supplier of such services and 
the parties could leverage their market power from the content, infrastructure and pay-
TV markets to foreclose any entry by third party; Premiere would reinforce its 
dominance on the German pay-TV and DT would strengthen its dominance on the 
German cable TV market because the parties controlling technical services (hence 
enjoying a sort of gate keeper function) could impede any entry on related markets. 
The merger was prohibited as no sufficient undertakings were proposed. Four years 
later in 1998, the same three German actors joined their forces again and notified two 
                                                 
81 L. Mc Callum, "EC Competition Law and Digital Pay Television", Competition Policy Newsletter 
1999/1, 4-16; A. Schaub et A. Lovergne, “La télévision numérique: l’approche de la Commission”, 
Cahiers de droit européen, 1999, 49-60. 
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agreements: joint control of the Premiere channel by Bertelsmann and Kirch, and joint 
control of BetaResearch (holding IPRs on set top boxes) by the three parties. This 
double operation was thus even more extensive than MSG as it covers pay-TV in 
addition to technical services. In the twin decisions Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere and 
Deutsche Telekom/Beta Research82, the Commission had concerns on three markets 
following the same rational than in MSG: Premiere would become the only German 
pay-TV operator, BetaResearch would become the main supplier of set top boxes 
technology; and DT would reinforce its dominance on German cable-TV. Again, the 
concentration was blocked as the parties (in particular Bertelsmann) were not ready to 
accept sufficient commitments. 
 
Then, the Kirch group continued to develop on its own pay-TV channel. However, 
due its financial constraints at a time when money was needed to develop interactive 
digital services, BSkyB (from Murdoch’s NewsCorp) acquired 24% of KirchPay TV 
in 1999. In BSkyB/KirchPayTV83, the Commission had concerns on two markets: 
reinforcement of dominance on the established markets for pay-TV because of the 
financial influx of BSkyB; and creation a dominant position on the emerging markets 
for interactive services and the related technical services as Kirch would benefit from 
the experience of BSkyB and could foreclose any entry due to its control of technical 
access services and pay-TV markets. The merger was cleared on condition aiming at 
securing entry on interactive services market with compulsory third party access to 
technical services (via access to API, use of open standardised API, simulcrypt, and 
compulsory licence), and entry to the pay TV market. Despite this influx of capital 
and experience from the UK, the Kirch Group went bankrupt in 2002 partly due to the 
very high sums paid for premium events rights, and Premiere was sold in 2003 to a 
group of financial investors. 
 
In the United Kingdom, BSkyB (the dominant UK pay TV operator), BT (the 
dominant telecom operator owing most of the copper loops and some cable TV), 
Midlands (now HSBC, an important banking institution) and Matsushita (a producer 
of electronic equipment and technology) were setting up in 1999 the venture British 
Interactive Broadcasting (later renamed Open) to provide digital interactive TV 
services (like information services, home shopping, home banking) by means of  
digital satellite broadcasting with a telecommunication return path, and the related 
technical services with a set-top box to be provided to consumers on a subsided basis. 
In BiB/Open84, the Commission had concerns on four markets: the venture would be 
dominant on the emerging set-top boxes market and could maintain this position 
through leverage from the parents’ position on the pay-TV and interactive TV 
services markets; this control on the set-top boxes would allow the parties to foreclose 
any entry on the emerging market of interactive TV services; the market power on pay 
TV market could be enhanced by the power on interactive services by bundling both 
products together; and finally BT would have less incentive to upgrade its cable TV or 
copper pairs in order to enable them to provide interactive services. The joint venture 
                                                 
82 P.D. Camesasca, "Mayday or Heyday? Dynamic Competition Meets Media Ownership Rules after 
Première", European Competition Law Review 2, 2000, 76-93; C. Veljanovski, “Competitive 
Regulation of Digital Pay TV”, in Grayston (ed), European Economics and Law, 1999, 54-85. 
83 A. Hobbs, “The Commission’s assessment of the participation of BSkyB in the pay-TV operations in 
Germany”, Competition Policy Newsletter 2000/3, 56-60. 
84 A. Font Galarza, "The British Interactive Broadcasting Decision and the application of competition 
rules to the new digital interactive television services", Competition Policy Newsletter 1999/3, 7-15. 
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was exempted in 1999 for seven years under several conditions to ensure equal entry 
on TV interactive services markets: open access to the set top boxes (including 
simulcrypt agreement and supplying of technical information) and a legal separation 
between Open's activities with respect to the boxes and those related to interactive 
services; possibility of BSkyB channels to include other interactive services than the 
one of Open; no bundling of Open and BSkyB’s services; and divestiture of BT cable 
interest (with Commission monitoring whether the BT's participation was not 
impeding the supply of broadband service on telecom infrastructure and a possibility 
to require if necessary for BT to choose between its continued participation in Open 
and the provision of unbundled access to its local loop). 
 
In Italy, Stream (the Italian pay TV controlled by NewsCorp and Telecom Italia) 
acquired in 2003 Telepiù (the other Italian pay TV owned by Vivendi) to form the 
main combined satellite pay-TV platform (later re-branded Sky Italia). In 
NewsCorp/Telepiù, the Commission85 considered that the merger would create a 
quasi-monopoly in the Italian pay-TV market with adverse effect on related markets 
like conditional access systems or acquisition of programming rights and channels. 
The concentration was cleared after imposing extensive remedies aimed to ensure 
competition from other satellite platforms and other digital TV platforms like 
terrestrial: divestiture of terrestrial broadcasting activities, compulsory third-party 
access to premium content and to the new Sky’s platform, with an arbitration 
procedure to ensure their effective implementation. Interestingly, the Italian NRA 
would supervise the remedies for the matters within its competence. 
 
With regard to the stream of alliances related to Internet services, the French 
communications group Vivendi (controlling Canal+) set up with Vodafone the 
Vizzavi venture to provide a multi-access Internet portal thorough Europe (providing 
customers with a seamless environment for web-based interactive services, across a 
variety of platforms such as fixed and mobile telephones, PCs and palm-tops and TV 
sets). In Vodafone/Vizzavi/Canal+, the Commission had concerns on two markets:  
Vizzavi would get a dominant position on the emerging markets for TV-based 
Internet portals and for pan-European mobile phone based internet portals because of 
the range of parties activities in mobile networks, content and television platforms, 
allowing them to foreclose competing content providers and portal providers. The 
merger was cleared on condition that consumers may access third party portal, and 
even change the default portal if they wish to do so. 
 
Then in the midst of the convergence hype, Time Warner (one of the world’s biggest 
media and entertainment companies) and AOL (the leading Internet access provider, 
with links with the content provider Bertelsmann) merge in a deal of 160 $bn their 
activities in 2000 to create the first Internet vertically-integrated content provider, 
distributing TW banded content through AOL’s Internet distribution network. In 
AOL/TimeWarner, the Commission had concerns on two markets: the new entity 
would acquire a dominant position on the emerging markets for Internet delivery on-
                                                 
85 V. Baccaro, “The Commission closes probe into pay-TV industry in Italy approving 
NewsCorp/Telepiù merger deal”, Competition Policy Newsletter 2003/2, 8-11; C. Caffara and A. 
Coscelli, “Merger to monopoly: NewsCorp/Telepiu”, European Competition Law Review, 2003, 625-
627. A similar merger was referred to the Spanish authorities in Commission Decision of 14 August 
2002, Sogecable/Via Digital, M. 2845, upheld in Cableuropa T-346/02 and T-347/02 [2003] not yet 
published. 
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line music and music player software because of the privileged access to Time 
Warner and Bertelsmann’s content). The merger was cleared with a package of 
remedies whose ultimate goal was to break the links between AOL and 
Bertelsmann86. 
  
In a parallel move, Vivendi (which had links with Fox studio via its interests in 
BSkyB) bought in 2000 Seagram (a Canadian conglomerate, controlling the Universal 
Studio) in a deal of 40 $bn. In Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram, the Commission had 
concerns on three markets. Canal+ would strengthen its dominance on the established 
market for pay-TV because the integrated group could leverage its position from the 
films content rights of Universal and Fox; and Vizzavi would acquire a dominant 
position on the emerging pan-European market for portals and market for on-line 
music because of the privileged access to Universal’s music content. The merger was 
cleared with extensive remedies aiming at alleviating any leverage: pay-TV 
competitors’ compulsory access to Universal’s film production and co-production, 
divestment of stake in BSkyB (thus breaking the link with Fox), and rival portals 
access to Universal’s online music content for five years.   
 
In 2003, DaimlerChrysler and Deutsche Telekom set up the Toll Collect venture to 
operate a system for the collection of road toll from heavy trucks in Germany, which 
may be used in the future as a platform to provide telematics services. The 
Commission had concern on one market: DaimlerChrysler would become dominant 
on the emerging market for telematics systems for transport and logistics businesses 
in Germany. The merger was cleared under conditions aiming at guaranteeing a level 
playing field for all providers of telematics systems: the parties commit to the 
formation of an independent Telematics Gateway company (not controlled by the 
parties) operating a central interface through which telematics services can be fed into 
the Toll Collect System, to the development an interface for connection to third party 
peripherals, and to the development a toll collection module to be integrated into third 
party telematics devices. Interestingly, DailmerChrysler was prohibited to offer any 
telematics services until the above mentioned remedies were in place. 
 
Thus for the digital TV cases, the Commission was first extremely cautious (and 
interventionist) as it was concerned that the parties would leverage their market power 
from the traditional content or infrastructure markets to the new TV services, 
foreclose entry on these markets and mutually reinforce their dominant positions. 
Moreover, the Commission aimed for intra platform competition, and wanted to 
ensure that condition for such competition were in place. However, in the more recent 
Italian decision (as well as the Spanish referral), the Commission was less strict as it 
understands that competition within each platform sounds economically unfeasible 
and that inter platform competition may be sufficient to ensure the bets possible to 
consumers. In any case, the Commission is stricter in media than in telecom because 
the geographical dimension of most markets are still national for cultural reasons, 
regulation and monopoly are still prevailing, and important objectives of cultural 
                                                 
86 The AOL/Time Warner was also cleared in the US, but with several additional conditions. On 14 
December 2000, the FTC imposed an open access on the TimeWarner cable to competing ISPs; and on 
11 January 2001, the FCC imposed in addition compulsory access to the ‘advanced’ instant messaging 
of the merging parties. 
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diversity and pluralism are at stake. For the Internet cases87, the Commission was 
concerned that the vertically integrated group would leverage its market power on the 
content side to foreclose entry on the emerging Internet distribution markets, and then 
mutually reinforce their position on these two type of markets. Thus remedies were 
imposed to impede any possibilities of leveraging and ensure an equal access to 
Internet distribution markets. 
 
 
1.4. Towards a regulatory antitrust 
 
To conclude this overview of the cases, we may observe that the use of competition 
law in electronic communications has been very extensive, surely much more than in 
traditional sectors88.  That is blurring the lines between antitrust and regulation, and 
between the different roles of the Commission as a competition authority or as 
regulator. The evolution may thus be analysed at the substantive and the institutional 
level. 
 
At the substantive level, the ex post antitrust intervention of the Commission in 
telecommunications was peculiar. First, the type of cases were different than in other 
sectors. Indeed, the Commission opened many exploitative excessive prices cases 
although in general the Commission does not wish to behave as price setting 
authority89 and understands to be particularly ill-equipped to assess excessive prices. 
Second, the way of intervening was also different. The Commission mainly adopted 
guidelines that were not based a stock of previous cases, or collected data on a broad 
basis. That makes its intervention closer to a policy making body or an industrial 
regulator. It is only in a second stage that the Commission opened individual cases, 
whose the vast majority have been passed to the NRAs or settled with the 
Commission.  
 
On the other hand with ex-ante control, the consistent line of the Commission has 
been to prevent a dangerous circle of self re-inforcing market power between related 
markets, whereby parties leverage their power from established markets to secure a 
dominant position on emerging markets and, in turn, leverage from the emerging 
market to strengthen their power on the established markets. This vicious circle is 
particularly worrying in ICT sector for three reasons at least. First, a lot of markets are 
only emerging and their development should not be controlled by a particular 
company. Second these markets are evolving very quickly and any anti-competitive 
behaviour could have rapid and irreversible effects. Third, most of the markets are 
characterised by network effects, that lead to path dependency with early developers 
(first mover advantage) becoming dominant by capturing new growth (bandwagon 
affect) so inefficient solution may be adopted90. To alleviate the vicious circle, the 
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Commission imposed structural remedies that stimulate infrastructure competition 
(like cable divestiture or unbundling of the local loop) for the parties to lose their 
dominant position on the traditional markets and their ability to leverage and foreclose 
entry on emerging markets. As the effects of these measures could only take place 
with time, the Commission complemented them with behavioural remedies aiming at 
forcing access to key facilities like content, fixed telecom infrastructure (in particular 
the local loop), mobile infrastructure, technical services for pay TV or interactive TV 
services. Moreover in some circumstances, these behavioural remedies may be 
preferable than structural ones when there is large fixed costs and a limited number of 
participants (like in some instances of the Telia/Telenor merger) 91. 
 
To use antitrust actions more extensively in electronic communications than in other 
sectors is clearly blurring the line between antitrust and regulation. That may be 
justified on economic grounds as the sector is characterised by the prevalence of 
market power acquired under legal monopoly time92. Heavy intervention is justified 
on static grounds (lots of dominant operator) and this argument is not undermined by 
dynamic considerations (because dominance is not the result of private investment 
decisions taken in a competitive environment and whose incentives should be 
preserved). Moreover in sectors where effective competition does not exist but is 
possible for the future, there may be a case for antitrust to actively promote 
competitors entry because it may pay in the long run to have many actors in the 
market competing with each other93. However when taking these arguments into 
account, the Commission practice (in particular the ex ante control of vertical 
alliances) appears to be too stringent or at least insufficiently motivated94. Economic 
literature95 has shown that leverage should be based on a monopoly and is only 
rational when there is no other way to reap the monopoly rent. Therefore, the 
Commission should have based its analysis on the markets where access obligations 
were imposed (content, fixed and mobile networks) by showing that they were 
enduringly monopolised, instead of focusing on the new emerging markets (like 
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global telecom services, interactive TV services, Internet distribution platforms) and 
their risks of foreclosure. 
 
At the institutional level, the Commission used its strong antitrust power to maintain 
the existing competitive level, but also to increase that level. If it is undisputed than 
maintaining competitive level is part of the political mandate of the Commission, 
going as far as increasing competition with antitrust competence is more debatable. 
Moreover, the Commission used its power to support its regulatory liberalisation 
agenda. As noted by Ungerer, one of the key senior Commission official96: 
 
The (exploitative excessive prices actions) aimed particularly at passing on rapidly 
the advantages of liberalisation in terms of price reductions and service developments 
to consumers – a major objective in order to show as rapidly as possible the effective 
consumer benefits and to secure sustained public support for liberalisation (p. 11). 
 
A major factor in the success of the liberalisation programme was the screening of the 
major strategic alliances which started to take shape during the mid-nineties in 
anticipation of liberalisation and which commanded substantial Member States 
interests and attention (…). The basic situation was that in the existing pre-1998 
market environment (with monopolies still persisting) these preparatory moves by the 
large incumbents would not have qualified for exemption under Article 81(3), given 
the potential of leveraging existing monopoly power into the new markets shaped by 
liberalisation and technological development. However, instead of taking a static 
approach, a dynamic solution was chosen. The Member States concerned were 
encouraged to change market conditions (by accelerating liberalisation), in order to 
make a clearing of the alliances (with conditions) possible. The dynamics of the 
process thus created a parallelism of interest (in accelerating liberalisation) between 
incumbents (in order to have their alliances cleared), Member States (in order to 
allow the development of the potential of their national markets) and the Commission 
(in order not to be obliged to block new services and new technologies). This was 
probably the turning point in the liberalisation exercise. It created substantial 
political impetus for rapid implementation of the legislative liberalisation framework 
by key Member States, both in Council and at national level for preparing national 
legislation in time and creating a national infrastructure of National Regulatory 
Authorities (p. 7-8). 
  
Thus, merger remedies have been used help the adoption of sector-specific legislation 
by the Member States. They have also paved the way for the future regulation. For 
instance, local loop unbundling was first imposed in Telia/Telenor and two years later 
by a European Regulation. Remedies could also go further than regulation but aim at 
the same objective. For example, the cable divestiture imposed in Telia/Telenor, in 
Telia/Sonera or in BiB/Open goes one step further than the cable Directive that just 
imposes separate legal entities97. Conversely, regulation has been taken into account 
when deciding the appropriate remedies. If the behaviours of the parties to a joint 
venture are strictly controlled by a sector specific authority, there is less risk of abuse 
and leverage, hence remedies could be less intrusive like in Concert or Unisource II. 
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The Commission also used its antitrust power to control NRAs in diagonal conflicts. 
Indeed, the three antitrust guidelines mentioned above aimed to influence the practice 
of the NCAs but also the NRAs when applying antitrust concepts. Moreover, the 
Commission closed abuse cases only after the NRAs had intervened satisfactorily 
from the Commission view. Otherwise, the Commission settled the case itself or even 
condemned the dominant undertaking (like in Deutsche Telekom98). Thus, the 
Commission behaved as a complement to the national regulators when they may not 
act under national law but also as a regulator of the regulators.  
 
These various uses of Commission antitrust power may be problematic for at least 
two reasons. First, the political mandate and the not fully open procedure to be 
followed by DG Competition when dealing with a case are not suited for such an pro-
active role in the market99. Indeed, operators are very often under no position to 
negotiate, and the clearance process turns into a game of regulatory extortion100. 
Second, it upsets the institutional balance at the European level, as the Commission is 
taking power from the Member States and their NRAs and behaving as European 
regulatory authority, even though such authority was rejected by the European 
legislator during the recent review of sector regulation to which we now turn.  
 
 
2. Sector-Specific Regulation 
 
2.1. Overview of the system 
 
As we have seen above, next to European competition law which applied across the 
broad to all economic sectors of the economy and prevail over any contrary national 
provisions, electronic communications are also regulated by a whole set of European 
sector rules that should be transposed into national laws. These sector rules aim to 
ensure the best possible deal for the European consumers and complement antitrust in 
ensuring that companies would not abuse their market power. 
 
The sector-specific regulation of the electronic communications has been recently 
reformed by the European legislature. The new European regulatory framework101 is 
now mainly composed of one liberalisation directive102 and four harmonisation 
directives103 whose national transposition measures were due to be applicable in July 
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2003104. As suggested by its denomination and to take into account the technological 
convergence, the framework covers105 not only telecommunications but also all 
electronic communications networks, services and associated facilities. It applies thus 
to all networks permitting the conveyance of signals (being wire or wireless, circuit or 
packet switched, used for telecom, broadcasting or other services), all the services 
consisting of the conveyance of signals on these networks, and all facilities that are 
associated with them (like conditional access systems contained in the set-top boxes 
used to receive digital television or electronic program guides). On the other hand, the 
directives do not cover the content of services delivered over electronic 
communications networks such as broadcasting or e-commerce services106. 
 
The part of the regulation devoted to the control of market power is the so-called 
Significant Market Power (SMP) regime107. The aim of the regime is twofold: (1) 
stimulate effective competition in market segments where it is possible, and (2) 
ensure sufficient access to wholesale inputs and protect against any behavioural 
abuses in the other segments where monopoly is inevitable. As illustrated in Figure 1, 
regulatory obligations are imposed in three steps which should be repeated 
periodically (every two to three years) to reflect market evolution. In the first step, 
markets to be analysed are defined in two sequences. The Commission adopts a 
Recommendation108 that defines, in accordance with the principles of competition 
law, the product and service markets within the electronic communications sector, the 
characteristics of which may be such as to justify the imposition of regulatory 
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elines/index_en.htm>. For an analysis of this Recommendation, A. de Streel, “Market Definitions in 
the New European Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications”, Info 5(3), 2003, 27-47. 
 27
obligations. In practice, the Commission has to select the markets justifying ex ante 
regulation because of their structural problems and then, delineate the boundaries of 
these markets on the basis of antitrust methodologies. Taking account109 of this 
Recommendation on relevant markets and the Commission Guidelines on market 
analysis110, the NRA then defines markets appropriate to national circumstances, in 
particular their geographical dimension within its territory, in accordance with the 
principles of competition law111. 
 
In the second step, the NRA analyses the defined markets to determine whether they 
are, or are not, effectively competitive, which amounts to determining whether one or 
more operators enjoy SMP on the market. In turn, this SMP assessment amounts to 
determining whether one or more undertakings enjoy a dominant position or could 
leverage a dominant position from a closely related market. 
 
In the third step, if the market is effectively competitive, the NRA must withdraw any 
obligation that may be in place and shall not impose or maintain any new one. 
Conversely, if the market is not effectively competitive, the NRA imposes on the 
SMP operators the appropriate specific regulatory obligations to be chosen from a 
menu provided in the Directives112. In case of an SMP operator on a wholesale market 
(i.e. relationship between the providers of electronic communications network and 
services), the regulator should rely on the menu of remedies provided in the Access 
Directive. In case of an SMP operator on a retail market (i.e. relationships between 
operators and end-users), the conditions of regulation are much more stringent as it 
has to be shown in addition of dominance that an intervention on a wholesale market 
could not solve the identified retail problem. Indeed, as most of retail anti-competitive 
behaviours stem from the exercise of market power on a upstream wholesale market, 
it is more appropriate to regulate this intermediate market (source of the problem) 
than the retail market (manifestation of the problem). When justified, NRA should 
rely on the non-exhaustive list of remedies provided in the Universal Service 
Directive. 
 
At the institutional level, the primary actor is the NRA that should undertake the 
market analysis and choose the appropriate remedies. To balance this important 
                                                 
109 Any Recommendation or soft law instruments should be taken into account by national authorities 
and national Courts, see Grimaldi C-322/88 [1989] ECR I-4407, para 18. The legal force of the 
Recommendation on relevant markets is further reinforced as the Commission may veto any different 
product and service market that an NRA may wish to define. 
110 Guidelines on market analysis, cited at note 14. 
111 Nevertheless, two types of markets have a special regime. First, if a selected market has a Trans-
national dimension (i.e. covers the Community of a substantial part thereof), the role of the 
Commission is more important due to the additional European interest at stake. It should define the 
product but also the geographical dimension of the markets, and adopt a Decision that is legally 
binding for the NRAs. Second, some markets to be analysed by the NRAs are pre-defined in the 
Directives, hence should not be identified again in the Commission Recommendation: Article 6 of the 
Access Directive (conditional access systems), Article 18 of the Universal Service Directive (minimum 
set of leased lines), Article 19 of the Universal Service Directive (access to and use of the public 
telephone network at a fixed location). 
112 European Regulators Group Common Position of 1 April 2004 on the approach to appropriate 
remedies in the new regulatory framework, ERG (03) 30rev1, available at: <http://www.erg.eu.int>, 
hereinafter Common Position on remedies. See R.A. Cawley, “The new approach to economic 
regulation in the electronic communications sector in Europe: the application of regulatory remedies”, 
Journal of Network Industries 5, 2004. 
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discretion, several check and balances (like broad appeal possibilities or compulsory 
consultation with the NCAs) and good governance mechanisms (like compulsory 
public consultation) have been put in place. The role of the Commission is crucial to 
ensure a common regulatory culture across Europe. It starts the process by adopting 
and updating the Recommendation on relevant markets. More importantly, the 
Commission may review113 all the NRAs decisions that would affect the trade 
between Member States. After the opinion of the Communications Committee, the 
Commission may veto a product and service market definition that differs from those 
of the Recommendation and an SMP (or a non SMP) designation. It may also give a 
non-binding opinion on the choice of regulatory obligations. In addition, the 
Commission keep in standard competence of ensuring the correct application of 
European law by the Member States (including the NRAs), with the possibility of 
opening infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Significant Market Power Regime 
 
 
STEP 1: Market Definition 
(Art 15 Framework Directive 
Commission Recommendation on relevant markets 
Commission Guidelines on market analysis) 
 
Step 1a: Market selection, by the Commission in a Recommendation 
Step 1b: Product market delineation, by the Commission in a Recommendation 
Step 1c: Market selection, by the NRA in a decision (under Commission veto) 
Step 1d: Product and geographical market definition, by the NRA in a decision (under 
Commission veto) 
 
⇓ 
 
STEP 2: Market Analysis 
(Arts 14 and 16  Framework Directive and 
Commission Guidelines on market analysis) 
 
Determination if one or several operators enjoy a dominant position, by the NRA 
(under Commission veto) 
 
⇓ 
 
STEP 3: Choice of Remedies 
(Arts 16  Framework Directive, 8  Access Directive, 17 Universal Service Directive 
Commission/ERG Remedies Joint approach 
                                                 
113 Article 7 of the Framework Directive, and Commission Recommendation of 23 July 2003 on 
notifications, time limits and consultation provided in Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, O.J. [2003] L 190/13. R. Krüger and L. Di Mauro, 
“The Article 7 consultation mechanism: managing the consolidation of the internal market for 
electronic communications”, Competition Policy Newsletter 2003/3, 33-36.  
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Commission Guidelines on market analysis) 
 
- In case of SMP operator  Imposition of the appropriate obligations, by the NRA 
(with Commission opinion) 
- In absence of SMP operator  Removal of any obligation, by the NRA 
 
 
2.2. Selection and assessment of market power 
 
(a) Selection of the regulated markets 
 
In electronic communications sector, lots of markets may be defined and several may 
lead to competition concerns, but only a sub-set of them are selected to be analysed by 
the NRAs. According to the Article 15 of the Framework Directive114, this selection 
should be based on the characteristics of the market, and more precisely on the 
relative efficiency of competition law remedies compared to sector remedies to 
address possible competition problems. In the Recommendation on relevant 
markets115, the Commission has interpreted this provision by referring to three 
cumulative criteria that should be fulfilled for a market to be selected. According the 
Commission and the ERG, the NRA should not re-assess these criteria when 
analysing one of the markets selected in the Recommendation, but rely on these 
criteria only when selecting an additional market116. Although this interpretation 
makes NRAs’ analysis easier, nevertheless we submit that Article 15 of the 
Framework Directive apply equally to the Commission and the NRAs. Thus the 
NRAs should prove the insufficiency of competition law remedies before regulating a 
market. 
 
The first criterion is static and relies on the presence of high and non-transitory 
barriers to entry. The barriers may be structural and result from original cost and 
demand economic conditions that create asymmetric conditions between incumbents 
and new entrants impeding or preventing market entry of the latter. The entry barriers 
may also be legal or regulatory and result from legislative, administrative or other 
state measures that have a direct effect on the conditions of entry. Both types of 
barriers are non-strategic (i.e. not artificially manufactured by the firms) as it was 
considered that strategic barriers like excessive investment or reinforcement of 
network effects would require idiosyncratic and episodic intervention, which would 
be better done under competition law. 
 
The second criterion is dynamic and amounts to evaluating if the market does have 
the characteristics such that it will tend towards effective competition over the 
relevant time horizon considered. If it is the case, the market should not be selected. 
The application of this criterion involves examining the state of competition behind 
the entry barriers, taking account of the fact that even when a market is characterised 
by high entry barriers, other structural factors or market characteristics may mean that 
                                                 
114 Article 15(1) and Recital 27 of the Framework Directive. 
115 Recitals 9 to 16 of the Recommendation on relevant markets, as explained by the Section 3.2 of the 
Explanatory Memorandum. 
115 Guidelines on market analysis, para 32. 
116 For instance, Commission decision of 11 December 2003, AT/2003/18, Austrian broadcasting 
transmission services. 
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it tends towards effective competition. This is for instance the case in markets with a 
limited, but sufficient, number of undertakings behind the entry barriers having 
diverging cost structures and facing price-elastic market demand. Entry barriers may 
also become less relevant with regard to innovation-driven markets characterised by 
ongoing technological progress. In such cases, competitive constraints often come 
from the threat of innovation by potential competitors that are not currently in the 
market. 
 
The third criterion relies on the relative efficiency of competition law remedies alone 
to address the market failure identified according to the two first criteria compared to 
the use of complementary ex ante regulation. It is fulfilled when ex ante regulation 
would address more efficiently the market failure than antitrust. Such circumstances 
would for example include situations where the compliance requirements of 
intervention are extensive, where frequent and/or timely intervention is indispensable, 
or where creating legal certainty is of paramount concern. It is not possible to give an 
exhaustive list of all the circumstances where antirust would be less efficient than 
sector regulation. In practical application, NRAs should consult with their competition 
authorities and take account of that body’s opinion when deciding whether use of both 
complementary instruments is appropriate to deal with a specific issue. 
 
Thus, “the combined analysis of the three criteria suggests that markets characterised 
by the presence of high barriers to entry (first criterion), which is not compensated by 
a dynamic market structure (second condition) should generally be selected unless the 
situation can be dealt with adequately by competition law remedies (third 
criterion)”117. In fact, these three criteria aimed to detect the ‘hard-core’ market power 
that justifies regulation. It mainly boils down to two structural market problems where 
economic theory has shown that the market left alone would not achieve an overall 
long term efficiency and that public intervention would be needed on an on-going 
basis (hence sector-specific regulation would be more efficient than competition law). 
The first situation applies when the cost structure and the level of the demand are such 
that they create asymmetric conditions between market players, the topical situation 
being a natural monopoly case. That may be the case for local fixed infrastructure, in 
particular in rural areas where the level of fixed sunk cost may be such that only a 
single network provider could be profitable118. The second situation is the presence of 
externalities (either due to network effects or tariff principles) where one player may 
impose a cost or a benefit to others without having to pay/being rewarded 
accordingly. That may be the case for fixed and mobile call termination in Europe due 
to the externalities generated by the calling-party principle.  
 
These three criteria show that the rationale justifying the regulation of SMP operators 
has been radically reformed. Under the 1998 framework, the SMP regime was mainly 
related to the competitive conditions under which infrastructures have been deployed. 
It mainly applied to markets previously under legal monopoly (fixed voice networks 
                                                 
117 D. Géradin and J.G. Sidak, cited at note 100, 21. 
118 On the economic characteristics of local network access: M.A. Fuss and L. Waverman, 
“Econometric Cost Functions”, in Handbook of Telecommunications Economics V.I, cited at note 37, 
144-177; F. Gasmi, J.J. Laffont, W.W. Sharkey, “The Natural Monopoly Test Reconsidered: An 
Engineering Process-Based Approach to Empirical Analysis in Telecommunications”, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 2002, 435-459; G.A. Woroch, “Local Network Competition”, in 
Handbook of Telecommunications Economics V.I, cited at note 37, 642-716. 
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and services119) and was thus linked to the so-called original sin of the previous 
monopolist. Under the new directives, the SMP regulation is dis-connected from the 
original sin, and linked to the inefficiency of antitrust to control market power. It 
represents thus a radical shift of the regulatory paradigm. Ironically, this may lead to 
an extension or even a perpetuation of sector regulation, although the new directives 
were deemed to be de-regulatory. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that new and emerging markets, in which market power 
may be found to exist because of ‘first mover’ advantages, should not in principle be 
selected120. This is because premature imposition of ex-ante obligation may unduly 
influence the competitive conditions taking shape in the market, even though the 
foreclosure of such emerging market by the leading operator should be prevented. 
However, the application of this principle may be tricky in practice121. When a new 
service requires a legacy infrastructure to be provided, NRA may regulate this legacy 
infrastructure to ensure a level playing field between incumbents and new entrants. In 
addition, a NRA may also regulate a emerging market when sufficient time has 
elapsed for the market to have become mature122. 
 
 
(b) Delimitation of the boundaries of the selected markets 
 
Having identified the problematic areas, the precise boundaries of the market should 
be delineated in accordance with the principles of competition law. Therefore, the 
principles and difficulties identified in section 1.2. apply. Nevertheless, identical 
methodologies applied in different contexts may lead to different results123. The 
market is usually defined more broadly under sector regulation than under 
competition law because an NRA starts from a broader perspective and adopts a 
prospective approach, whereas the antitrust authority deals with a precise event that 
may be linked to one or more undertakings around which the market is defined. Note 
in addition that the first Commission Recommendation on relevant markets still very 
much define the markets on a technological basis, albeit to a lesser extent than under 
the 1998 regulatory framework, because markets have not yet fully converged. 
Therefore, customers’ preferences (demand substitution) are still linked to 
technologies and different group of customers (like residential and business) may be 
served by different technologies. In addition, the possibilities for network suppliers to 
switch from networks (supply substitution) are limited. Only in a fully convergent 
world, markets would be defined on a purely service basis, freed from any 
technological limitations. 
 
 
(c) Assessment of the Significant Market Power 
 
                                                 
119 There was nevertheless a slight possibility to regulate the mobile sector, that has been used more 
and more over time by the regulators across Europe: Article 7(2) of the Interconnection Directive 
97/33. 
120 Recital 27 of the Framework Directive and Guidelines on market analysis, para 32. 
121 Draft Remedies Joint Approach, pp. 71-73. 
122 Moreover, the market to be analysed is defined according to services offered substitutability and not 
according to the infrastructure. Thus the test is more related to the novelty of the service than to the 
novelty of the infrastructure. 
123 Guidelines on market analysis, para 24-32. 
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Once markets have been defined, the NRA analyse them to determine if one or more 
operators have a degree of market power equivalent to a dominant position, or would 
be able to leverage from a dominant position. As sector regulation intervenes ex ante, 
the market power should be appraised by the NRAs on a forward-looking basis by 
considering the expected or foreseeable development over a reasonable period linked 
to the characteristics and the timing of the next review, past data being taken into 
account when relevant124. The principles identified in section 1.2 thus apply, but 
again, the use of identical methodologies in different contexts may lead to different 
results125. Indeed, the SMP operator does not necessarily enjoy a dominant position 
under Article 82 EC because the relevant market may be defined differently and SMP 
is assessed more prospectively. Moreover, the SMP designation is based on structural 
criteria and do not lead, nor presume, that the operator has committed an abuse. 
 
 
2.3. Remedies126 
 
(a) Principles 
 
If one or more operators enjoy a dominant position, and consequently have been 
designated as having SMP, the NRA must impose at least one obligation and may 
impose more than one, to be chosen among those provided in the Directives127. This 
choice might be constrained by the international commitments taken by the Member 
States, in particular in the WTO128. When an operator enjoys SMP on a wholesale or 
intermediate market, the choice should in principle be done among the menu of 
ascending remedies provided in Articles 9 to 13 of the Access Directive129. 
 
First, NRA may impose a transparency obligation (Article 9 of the Access Directive), 
requiring operator to make public specified information, such as technical 
specifications, network characteristics, accounting information, or terms and 
conditions for supply and use. In particular, the authority may require the publication 
                                                 
124 Guidelines on market analysis, para 20 and 75; see also in general: ERG Working Paper of May 
2003 on the SMP concept for the new regulatory framework, ERG (03) 09. 
125 Guidelines on market analysis, para 24-32. 
126 See the three studies done for the Commission services: Reports of the Economic Expert Group on 
Remedies, September 2003; C. Veljanovski, Remedies under the new EU regulation of the 
Communications Sector, June 2003, available at: 
<http://www.casecon.com/data/pdfs/ETNOfinalreport.pdf>; M. Cave, "Economic Aspects of the New 
Regulatory Regime for Electronic Communication Services", September 2002, available at 
<http://users.wbs.warwick.ac.uk/group/cmur/publications/discussion_papers>. 
127 Guidelines on market analysis, para 114. 
128 Council Decision 97/838/EC on the results of the WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications 
services, and its annex containing the additional commitments take by the European Communities and 
their Members States, O.J. [1997] L 347/45. For the markets covered by the commitments, the NRAs 
should impose at least three obligations (transparency, non-discrimination, cost-orientation); and the 
first case decided under this Annex: Report of the WTO Panel of 2 April 2004, Mexico v. USA, 
WT/DS204/R. See also: P. Larouche and M. Bronckers, “The WTO Regime for Telecommunications 
Services’, in A. Appleton and P. Macrory (eds), The World Trade Organization: A Comprehensive 
Guide, Kluwer, forthcoming in 2004; J. Scherer (ed), Telecommunications in Europe, 4th ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1998, Ch. 24. 
129 Described in more detail in Section 3 of the draft Remedies Joint Approach. 
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of a reference offer130, which shall be sufficiently unbundled, and it may even impose 
changes to these offers. The disclosure of technical information for a firm’s access to 
technical facilities may be useful to achieve interconnection or network access, 
although the standardisation process may have already placed much of the 
information in the public domain. On the other hand, disclosure of price data may be 
an instrument of collusion or price leadership and hence is particularly unsuitable in 
cases of collective dominance. 
 
Second, the NRA may impose a non-discrimination obligation (Article 10), requiring 
the operator to apply equivalent conditions in equivalent circumstances to other 
undertakings providing equivalent services. A vertically integrated firm should 
provide services and information to others under the same conditions and quality as it 
provides for its own services or subsidiaries. This obligation is primarily relevant in 
case of an SMP operator that is vertically integrated into a competitive market to 
prevent exclusionary behaviour through foreclosure of competition in the upstream or 
the downstream market. But the NRA should apply this remedy in a nuanced way, as 
it may be efficient to allow price discrimination according to the customers’ 
willingness to pay or the product demand elasticity (like a Ramsey pricing)131. For 
instance, it may be efficient and not anti-competitive for a mobile operator to price the 
access to its network according to the different willingness to pay of the service 
providers seeking access. Indeed, the mobile operator may want to charge differently 
the providers of content over mobile phone, according to the value of their content for 
the end-users. 
 
Third, the NRA may impose an accounting separation obligation (Article 11), 
requiring in particular a vertically integrated company to make transparent its 
wholesale and internal transfer prices132. The authority may also require that 
accounting records are provided on request, and it may even specify the format and 
accounting methodology to be used. As this obligation represents a considerable 
ratcheting up of the regulatory burden on the SMP operator, it is only justified when 
there is persistent network monopoly enjoying an entrenched competitive advantage. 
 
Fourth, the NRA may impose an access obligation (Article 12), requiring the operator 
not to withdraw access, to negotiate in good faith or to give third party access to 
specific network facilities for fair compensation. This notion of access should be 
construed broadly133, as it covers access to wire and wireless network elements (like 
access to the fixed local loop, or roaming on other mobile networks), access to 
associated facilities (like the conditional access system for digital television), access 
to physical infrastructure (like buildings, ducts and masts), or access to relevant 
software systems (like operational support system, or number translation system). The 
NRA could impose access when a refusal would hinder the emergence of a 
                                                 
130 According to Article 9(4) of the Access Directive, when an operator should give access to the 
twisted metallic pair local loop, the NRA should ensure the publication of a reference offer containing 
at least the elements set out in the Annex II of the Access Directive like prices or  technical conditions. 
131 H. Varian, “Price discrimination”, in R. Schmalensee and R. Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial 
Organization V. I, North-Holland, 1989, 597-654. See in addition: M. Cave, “Can Regulators Get 
Smart about Discrimination?”, 2002, available at: 
<http://users.wbs.warwick.ac.uk/cmur/publications/mec819.pdf> 
132 A. Tarrant, “Accounting Separation: The Hole in the Heart of EU Telecommunications Regime”, 
European Competition Law Review 2003, 273-279. 
133 Article 2 of the Access Directive. 
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sustainable competitive market at the retail level or would not be in the end-users 
interests. Therefore the test to impose third-party access under sector regulation 
appears to be softer134 -that is easier to meet by access seekers- than the one under 
competition law. Indeed under the essential facility doctrine, access may only be 
imposed when the facility is essential. But there is no compelling economic rationale 
justifying a situation whereby access should be more easily granted under sector-
specific regulation than under antitrust135, as the same conflict between short-run and 
long run competition holds. Indeed, short-run interests might best be furthered by the 
adoption of mandatory access on a wide scale, but such policy would reduce 
incentives to invest in competing facilities and would stifle innovation in the long 
term. Therefore, NRA should be very cautious before imposing access, and in any 
case, safeguard competition in the long run taking into account the investment and 
risks taken by the facility owner. 
 
The NRAs have set their views on the application of these principles in the draft 
Remedies Joint Approach. The NRA should first assess if the infrastructure is likely 
to be replicated or not. If the duplication is not feasible nor desirable due to the 
persistent presence of significant economies of scale and scope or other entry 
restriction, the NRA must ensure sufficient access to wholesale inputs in order to 
secure maximum consumer benefits and should protect against any potential 
behavioural abuses. Conversely, if infrastructure duplication is feasible, remedies 
should assist the transition process to a sustainable competitive market and provide 
new entrants with incentives to climb the investment ladder (e.g. from bitstream to 
unbundling to no more regulation) with dynamic access point determination and price 
setting. Indeed, there is no conflict between infrastructure (facilities-based) 
competition and service (access-based) competition, when time dimension is taken 
into account. NRAs should provide incentive for competitors to seek access from the 
incumbent in the shorter term and to rely increasingly on building their own 
infrastructure in the longer term136. When the NRAs can not determine with sufficient 
certainty if infrastructure is duplicable, they should keep an open mind and continue 
monitoring to re-assess their views, while being aware of the possibility of inefficient 
investment. 
 
                                                 
134 One plausible explanation for the apparent easier compulsory access under sectoral law could be 
that access to infrastructure laid down with exclusive or special rights and/or financed with public 
funds should be more easily granted that access to facility developed in a competitive environment (see 
along these lines, para 66 of the Opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs in Bronner, cited at note 41). 
However, the difference should not be overstated. Intervention under sector regulation should pass an 
additional test (market selection) that antitrust intervention does not have. This test may encompass 
some sort of natural monopoly requirement, which is the main object of the essential facility doctrine. 
135 J.E. Haussman and J.G. Sidak, “A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of 
Telecommunications Networks”, Yale Law Journal 109, 1999, 417-505. The authors suggest that an 
NRA imposing compulsory access should use a consumer-welfare test (as captured by the essential 
facility doctrine) and not a competitor-welfare test. As noted by Breyer, “Increased sharing by itself 
does not automatically mean increased competition. It is in the unshared, not in the shared portions of 
the enterprise that meaningful competition would likely to emerge. Rules that force firms to share 
every resource or element of the business would create, not competition, but pervasive regulation, for 
the regulators, not the market place, would set the relevant terms”, quoted in A.E. Kahn, Whom the 
Gods Would Destroy or How not to Deregulate, AEI Press, 2001, 7. 
136 M. Monti, Remarks at the European Regulators Group Hearing on Remedies, Speech 26.1.2004, 
p.3. 
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Fifth, the NRA may impose price control obligations (Article 13). The authority 
could prohibit anti-competitive pricing practices, like prices which are excessive, 
predatory, or creating margin squeeze. The NRA could also impose positive price 
control137 provided it promotes efficiency and allows the operator a reasonable rate of 
return on adequate capital employed taking into account the risks involved. Different 
methods of price control are possible. The NRA can rely on benchmarking and set 
prices according to those applied in comparable competitive markets138. It can also 
follow a ‘retail minus’ methodology and set the wholesale price on the basis of a 
freely determined retail price, minus a mark-up compensating for the retail services 
(marketing, customer care, …). With sufficient information about the actual cost, the 
authority can use them to directly set prices, possibly relying on different accounting 
methods than those used by the regulated operator. For the pricing of fixed 
interconnection as well as for the pricing of unbundled access to the local loop139, the 
Commission recommended the use of a Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) 
methodology, which consists of evaluating the network elements at the current or 
prospective value of an efficient operator and allocate them in accordance with the 
principle of cost causation. In addition, the NRA could also rely on a sophisticated 
pricing design. For example, given the very significant fixed costs in telecom and the 
consequent divergence between average and marginal cost, a non linear pricing 
structure consisting of a fixed fee combined with a unit charge equal to marginal cost 
may be appropriate140. 
 
When cost orientation is chosen, the burden of proving that prices are cost oriented 
lies with the regulated operator. As this last variation of price control is very intrusive, 
it should only be used with extreme parsimony and be confined to cases close to the 
existence of an essential facility. That may be the case for the different types of access 
to the fixed local network (call termination, unbundling of the local loop, bitstream) 
provided that one operator enjoys a monopoly or position of super-dominance in the 
relevant geographical area. On the other hand, when there is network duplication like 
in the mobile industry, non-discrimination or other forms of price control may be 
preferable. 
 
                                                 
137 OECD, Access Pricing in Telecommunications, 2004; B. Mitchell and I. Vogelsang, 
Telecommunications Pricing: Theory and Practice, C.U.P., 1991. 
138 The Commission recommended the benchmarking for the interconnection charges on fixed telecom 
networks from 2000 to 2002, when it was deemed no longer necessary due to the increasing availability 
of cost accounting systems: Commission Recommendation of 8 January 1998 on interconnection in a 
liberalised telecommunications market (Part 1 - Interconnection pricing), O.J. [1998] L 73/42, last 
amended by Commission Recommendation of 22 February 2002, O.J. [2002] L 58/56. 
139 Commission Recommendation on interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications market - Part 
1 at para 3; and Commission Recommendation of 25 May 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, 
O.J. [2000] L 156/44 at Article 1(6). See also: Europe Economics, Study on the preparation of an 
adaptable bottom-up costing model for interconnection and access pricing in European Union 
countries, April 2000. Independent Regulators Group (which is the association of all the NRAs of the 
Member States and some other European countries), Principles of implementation and best practice 
regarding FL-LRIC cost modelling, 2000, <http://irgis.icp.pt/site/en/index.asp>. These principles are 
currently being revised in: ERG Consultation Document Proposed ERG common position on FL-LRIC 
modelling, July 2003. 
140 On the relationship between access pricing and investment and entry, see the papers in  
Telecommunications Policy 27, 2003, 657-727 (special issue edited by M. Cave). These papers suggest 
an access price positively related to the replicability of the asset, and rising over time. This scheme 
aims to ensure static as well as dynamic efficiency. 
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In exceptional circumstances, the regulator may also impose other obligations than 
those listed in the Access Directive, provided it gets the prior agreement of the 
Commission141. For instance, if justified, the NRA could impose technical solutions 
(like the use of multiple SIM cards in mobile handsets) or changes in the tariff 
principles (like imposing receiving-party-pays instead of the current calling-party-
pays principle) to address the mobile termination problem. More importantly, the fact 
that the obligations listed in the Access Directive are all behavioural does not exclude 
structural solution. The NRA could thus impose divestiture and the much discussed 
structural separation of the local loop142. Nevertheless, if possible in theory, this 
remedy would be very difficult to apply in practice as the Commission, and the Courts 
in case of legal challenges, should be convinced that the available remedies are 
insufficient and that a structural separation is the only way forward143.  
 
In contrast with wholesale markets, two conditions must be fulfilled in regulating a 
retail market: (1) one or more operators should enjoy an SMP position on a relevant 
market, and (2) the obligations that may be imposed on wholesale markets would not 
be able to achieve the three objectives of the new framework, in particular the 
effective competition. If it is the case, the NRA shall thus impose one or more 
obligations, to be chosen from the non exhaustive list provided in Article 17 of the 
Universal Service Directive. The NRA may impose the same type of price control 
listed above (prohibition of anti-competitive pricing practices or positive price 
control), possibly adapted to take account of the characteristics of the market to be 
regulated. Moreover, as the SMP regime mainly aims at ensuring effective 
competition, the retail tariffs control should only ensure competition, hence the 
orientation of prices towards costs. They should not guarantee other objectives such 
as general accessibility and affordability of certain services, hence tariffs below costs 
(which is the remit of the universal service). To ensure effective price control, the 
regulator could impose the implementation of appropriate cost accounting systems144, 
with specific format and methodology and whose compliance would be verified by a 
qualified independent body. Going beyond price control, the NRA could also impose 
other types of obligations such as the prohibition of discrimination between end-users 
or unreasonable bundling of services145, or any other remedies that may be 
appropriate. 
 
The choice of obligations146 made by the NRA should respect three general principles.  
First, the remedies should be based on the nature of the problem identified and 
appropriate to address it. Thus, the NRA first identifies the market failure and the 
underlying economic incentives and possibilities to behave anti-competitively. Four 
                                                 
141 Article 8(3) of the Access Directive. 
142 OECD, Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition, 2001; OECD Working Paper 3 November 
2003, The Benefits and Costs of Structural Separation of the Local Loop, DSTI/ICCCP/TISP(2002)13. 
143 Several arguments militate against the separation of the local loop at this stage of market 
development, in particular the difficulty to identify a stable dividing line between potentially 
competitive and non-competitive activities and the related problem of co-ordinating investment 
activities between the network company LoopCo and the service company ServCo. See M. Cave, “Is 
LoopCo the Answer?”, Info 4(4), 2002, 25-34 
144 See further the Study made for the Commission services: Andersen, Implementation of cost 
accounting methodologies and accounting separation by telecommunications operators, July 2002. 
145 See note 46. 
146 Article 8(4) of the Access Directive. 
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main problems have been identified by the NRAs147: single dominance leading to 
entry deterrence, allocative inefficiencies (like excessive price) and productive 
inefficiencies (like lack of investment); vertical leveraging leading to denial of access, 
price or non price leverage actions; horizontal leverage leading to anti-competitive 
bundling of cross-subsidisation; and call termination charges setting leading to tacit 
collusion and/or excessive prices. Second, the obligations should be justified in light 
of the three objectives of the new framework (effective competition, internal market, 
and interests of the European citizens148). Finally, remedies should be proportionate, 
which implies that they should be the least burdensome option possible to achieve the 
regulatory aim149. This ‘proportionalisation’ of the obligations is one of the key 
innovations of the new regulatory framework as previously the NRAs had to apply 
automatically the whole set of remedies provided in the directives (and corresponding 
to all the five obligations described above). Thus NRA should undertake a regulatory 
options assessment of alternative remedies (if available) so that the least burdensome 
remedies effective remedy will be selected. However, that does not necessarily lead to 
the high evidentiary standard of full cost-benefit analysis of an NRA intervention, as 
suggested by some150. In addition to these three principles, NRAs committed in the 
draft Remedies Joint Approach to ensure that obligation would be incentive 
compatible. Wherever possible, NRAs should formulate, remedies in such way that 
the advantages to the regulated party of compliance outweigh the benefits of evasion. 
 
 
(b) Implementation 
 
In its first Recommendation on relevant markets of February 2003, the Commission 
identified 18 markets (7 retail and 11 wholesale) to be analysed by the NRAs. That 
may lead to an increase of regulation as more market segments are covered than under 
the previous regulatory framework. However, it should not be inferred that the 
Commission is in favour of more regulation as its discretion in selecting markets was 
strongly constrained by the Annex I of the Framework Directive (which contains a list 
of markets to be identified in the initial Recommendation). In practice, the 
Commission had merely to re-define the markets listed in the Annex according to 
competition law methodologies and add the relevant markets related to the 
broadcasting sector. 
 
On the basis of this Recommendation, NRAs started their market analysis, and 
adopted draft decisions to be notified to the Commission for review under the Article 
7 procedure151. Moreover, to ensure smooth co-operation, several pre-notification 
meetings were held between the Commission and individual NRA. At the end of 
2003, 42 draft decisions (mainly from the British and the Finnish regulators) have 
                                                 
147 Draft Remedies Joint Approach, pp. 23-45. 
148 Article 8 of the Framework Directive. 
149 Guidelines on market analysis, para 118. On the proportionality principle, see: P. Craig and G. de 
Burca, EU Law, 3rd ed, O.U.P., 2002; Fedesa C-331/88 ECR [1990] I-4023, para 13. 
150 C. Veljanovski, cited at note 126, 18. See also Recital L of Resolution of the European Parliament 
of 18 November 2003 on the Eight Report from the Commission on the implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory package, A5-0376/2003. 
151 See the website of the Electronic Communications Consultation Task Force: 
<http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home>. 
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been notified to the Commission, which has reviewed 31 of them152. These 
Commission decisions shed some light on the three steps of the SMP regime, although 
each decision is case-specific. With regard the market definition, more segmented 
markets than those of the Recommendation may be accepted provided it is strongly 
justified or that it would not lead to different result that those obtained with a broader 
market definition153. With regard the SMP/dominance assessment, NRAs should 
determine if the observed effective competition resulted (or not) from the regulation 
in place154. Indeed, if regulation is only due to regulation, there is no case to repeal 
obligations. With regard the choice of remedies, the NRA should justify an imposition 
of differentiated remedies (for instance, different remedies according to the size of the 
operator) addressing the same market failure155.  
 
Turning now to the NRA and the ERG, we observe a gap between their de-regulatory 
rhetoric and their actual decisions. First, the draft Remedies Joint Approach looks 
very interventionist. Many market failures are identified and for many of them lots (if 
not the whole list) of remedies will be applied. Second, the more specific policy 
papers on particular issues (such bitstream or mobile termination156) are also very 
interventionist. We may thus question if the new framework will truly lead to less 
regulation and over time a complete phasing out of sector regulation to the benefits of 
a mere application of antitrust, as the suggested by the political rhetoric of the three 
main European institutions157. The initial application does not seem to go in this 
direction, and some NRAs want to use their enhanced discretion to increase 
regulation158. The application of the new directives may end up liked the 
implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act: deemed to be de-regulatory, it 
led to a triplement of the number of pages in the official compendium of the FCC 
decisions and proceedings, while the membership in the Federal Communications Bar 
                                                 
152 COCOM 04-19 of 2 March 2004, available at: 
<http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/cocom1/library>. Note that until now, the Commission has 
veto one NRA decision, related to a draft decision of the Finnish regulator not to regulate the retail 
fixed international telephone services: Commission Decision of 20 February 2004, FI/2003/24 and 
FI/2003/27, publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for 
residential and non-residential customers. 
153 Commission Decision of 24 September 2003, UK/2003/7, UK/2003/8, UK/2003/9, UK/2003/10, 
Fixed narrowband retail services. 
154 For instance, Commission Decision of 17 December 2003, FI/2003/23 and FI/2003/26, National 
telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential and non-residential customers. 
155 For instance, Commission Decision of 17 December 2003, FI/2003/20 and FI/2003/21. 
156 ERG Common Position of 2 April 2004 on Bitstream Access, ERG (03) 33rev1; ERG/IRG 
Principles of Implementation and Best Practice of November 2003 on the applications of remedies in 
the mobile voice call termination market. 
157 Communication of the Commission of 10 November 1999, The 1999 Communications Review 
COM(1999) 623, p. 49; Resolution of the European Parliament of 13 June 2000 on the 1999 
Communications Review of the Commission A5-0145/2000, O.J. [2001] C 67/53, Point A; Statement 
of Reasons of the Council Common Position 38/2001 of 17 September 2001 on the Framework 
Directive, O.J. [2001] C 337/51, para II.1. 
158 See in general on de-regulation and sunset clauses: M. Cave, “Ofcom and light touch regulation”, in 
C. Robinson (ed), Successes and Failures in Regulating and Deregulating Utilities, E. Elgar, 2004; J. 
Stern, “Regulatory forbearance: why did Oftel find it so hard?”, Telecommunications Policy, 2004, 
273-294; L. Waverman, “Regulatory incentives and deregulation in telecommunications”, in C. 
Robinson (ed), Competition and Regulation in Utility Markets, E. Elgar, 2003, 138-159. 
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Association increased by 73% between 1995 and 1998 and has remained essentially at 
that level159.  
 
 
2.4. Towards a pre-emptive antitrust 
 
The SMP regime has been radically reformed with the new directives. Under the 1998 
regulatory package, the market areas to be regulated were pre-defined in the directives 
on the basis of their technical characteristics160 and the SMP threshold mainly equated 
to 25% market shares in these areas. The NRA had then to impose on the SMP 
operators the full set of obligations provided in the directives without being able to 
choose the most appropriate ones. If these crude rules and assumptions were adapted 
to the first phase of the liberalisation when market structure were still relatively 
simple, they were not suited any more in a second phase when effective competition 
appears in some market segments but not in others and technology evolves rapidly. 
Another system had to be found that guaranteed at the same time flexibility and legal 
certainty. As competition law methodologies seemed to fulfil these contradictory 
characteristics, the European legislature decided to align the SMP regime with these 
methodologies leading to an ‘hybridisation’ of sectoral regulation, which becomes a 
sort of ‘pre-emptive competition law’161.  
 
This new system has several advantages. It makes the regime more flexible and based 
on solidly grounded economic principles that ensures regulatory decisions closer to 
the reality of the market. And this increased flexibility should not be at the expense of 
legal certainty (as decisions will be based on more than forty years of antitrust case-
law), nor regulatory harmonisation (as NRAs’ decisions are based on legal principles 
that are strongly "Europeanised" and the control of the Commission over the NRAs’ 
decisions is reinforced). Moreover, the system ensures a progressive removal of 
obligations as competition develops in the different markets (market-by-market sunset 
clauses) and facilitates the transition towards the mere application of competition law 
when sector regulation will no longer be necessary. More fundamentally, regulation is 
adapting itself to suit the philosophy and the approach of competition policy. Indeed, 
regulation can not be seen anymore as an independent –or even opposite- to antitrust, 
but must be seen as a part of a broader set of tools based on competition analysis 
principles. These complementary instruments deal with a common problem (high 
level of market power and the likelihood of it being abused) and try to achieve a 
common aim (putting end-user at the centre of any economic activity)162. If 
successful, this type of regulation may be extended to other sectors in the future, 
thereby ensuring harmonisation across countries but also across sectors. 
 
                                                 
159 J.G. Sidak, “The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American 
Telecommunications After Deregulation”, Yale Journal of Regulation 20, 2003, 207. 
160 Mainly four markets were defined: fixed voice telephony (Directive 98/10 and Annex 1 Part 1 of the 
Directive 97/33), mobile voice telephony (Annex 1 Part 3 of the Directive 97/33), leased lines 
(Directive 92/44 and Annex 1 Part 2 of the Directive 97/33), national fixed and mobile interconnection 
(Article 7(2) of the Directive 97/33): Note from the Commission services/DG XIII of 1 March 1999, 
Determination of Organisations with Significant Market Power, cited at note 32. 
161 P. Buiges, “A Competition Policy Approach”, in P. Buiges and P. Rey (eds), cited at note 34. 
162 M. Monti, Competition and Regulation in the new Framework, speech 15.7.2003; R. Krüger and L. 
Di Mauro, cited at note 113, p. 36. 
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However, the implementation of this new system, which is more based on theoretical 
thinking than practical experience, presents also several risks. At the outset, note that 
antitrust principles are useful but insufficient to base sector regulation. Indeed, these 
principles detect all kinds of market power and are not able to screen the subset 
among them –hard core market power- that justify regulation163. Thus, mere antitrust 
principles may be necessary but should be completed by other elements that have 
nothing to do with antitrust principles, i.e. the three selection criteria. Moreover, the 
use of antitrust principles may increase regulatory costs when compared to the 
previous regime as the concepts are more complex to apply (more economic analysis) 
and less certain (even after 40 years case-law some antitrust concepts remain unclear). 
This uncertainty may increase the number of legal challenges, all the more so that the 
new directives have increased the possibilities and incentives to appeal NRAs’ 
decisions164. Finally, the convergence of the dominant and SMP concepts may have 
spill over effect in the antitrust practice. Indeed, NRA may want to define market 
narrowly to be able to find SMP operator and regulate them. In turn, that may lead to 
more frequent finding of dominance165.  
 
 
3. Conclusion: Comparison between the SMP regime and European Competition 
Law166 
 
This paper shows that over time competition law and sector regulation converge 
towards each other such that the frontier between each legal instrument is becoming 
more and more fuzzy. However, divergences remain so that competition law and 
sector regulation do not coincide and should not be confused with each other. They 
should be seen as complementary and not substitute in the broader category of the 
economic regulation. 
 
First, the objectives of both instruments converge to some extent. Traditionally, 
competition law controls market power where market structures are a priori 
satisfactory and aims solely to maintain the existing level of competition, whereas 
sector regulation controls market power where competition is not possible or desirable 
                                                 
163 A. de Streel, cited at note 108, p. 40. 
164 See Article 4 of the Framework Directive. 
165 L. Garzaniti, cited at note 3, p. 541. 
166 For a comparison between competition law and sector regulation: see references in note 3; and B. 
Doherty, "Competition Law and Sector-Specific Regulation", Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review 8, 2001, 225-232; D. Geradin (ed), The Liberalization of State Monopolies in the European 
Union and Beyond, Kluwer, 2000; K.W. Grewlich, “Cyberspace: Sector-Specific Regulation and 
Competition Rules in European Telecommunications”, Common Market Law Review 36, 1999, 937-
969; ITU, Competition Policy in Telecommunications - Background paper for the workshop held on 
20-22 November 2002, available at: <http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/competition/documents.html>; M. 
Kerf and D. Geradin, Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust vs Sector-Specific 
Regulation, O.U.P., 2003; J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole, cited at note 37, 276-280; P. Nihoul, “Convergence 
in European Telecommunications: a case study on the relationship between regulation and competition 
law”, International Journal of Communications Law and Policy 2, 1998; OECD, Relationship between 
Regulators and Competition Authorities, June 1999, DAFFE/CLP(99)8: E. Pitt, “Telecommunications 
Regulation: Is it Realistic to Rely on Competition Law?”, European Competition Law Review, 1999, 
245-248; P.J. Slot and A. Skudder, “Common Features of Community Regulation in the Network 
Based Sectors”, Common Market Law Review 38, 2001, 87-129. For an US perspective: H.A. 
Shelanski, "From sector-specific regulation to antitrust for US telecommunications: The prospects for 
transition", Telecommunications Policy 26, 2002, 335-355. 
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(natural monopoly or oligopoly). In electronic communications, an additional role has 
been assigned to both legal instruments: increase the level of competition when 
possible. Thus, antitrust aims to maintain competition, but also to increase 
competition by stimulating entry. Regulation aims to increase competition when 
possible, and otherwise permanently control the non contestable monopolists. 
 
Second, the conditions for the public authorities to intervene also converge. Antitrust 
applies to all market segments and is triggered by a specific behaviour of the firms 
(abuse of dominant position, agreement or concerted practice, concentration) that 
should be proved anti-competitive. On the other hand, the SMP regime is limited to 
certain markets fulfilling rigorous selection criteria and then applies generally each 
time there are dominant operators. There is a convergence as under both instruments, 
dominance is a key criterion to intervene, although its practical assessment may differ 
under antitrust and sector regulation. However, important divergences remain because 
antitrust intervention should be based on anti-competitive behaviour, whereas on the 
selected markets, sector intervention should not be justified by an anti-competitive 
behaviour. In other words, the burden of proof for an NRA is fairly high when 
selecting a market, but becomes quite low (and lower than antitrust) to intervene on 
the selected markets.  
 
Third, the range of possible remedies converge. Under ex post antitrust, the recent 
decentralisation Regulation clarified that behavioural but also structural remedies may 
be imposed, with a priority for the former. Moreover, fines may be imposed by 
authorities and damages may be granted by Courts in private actions. Under ex ante 
merger control, remedies should be structural. This requirement has recently been 
interpreted so broadly by the Court that behavioural remedies having structural effects 
may be accepted and indeed have been used extensively in electronic communications 
mergers. Under sector regulation, the remedies listed in the directives are behavioural, 
but NRA may also exceptionally impose structural remedies. Thus, with the recent 
development of antitrust and sector law, structural and behavioural remedies may be 
imposed under both instruments. However, some divergences remain. First, the 
priority principles in the choice of remedies vary. Second, behavioural remedies under 
sector regulation may go further than the ones available under antitrust167. Third, fines 
and private damages are normally not available under sector regulation. 
 
Fourth, the institutions in charge of each instrument still diverge. At the European 
level, there is a body applying antitrust whereas there is no equivalent to apply sector 
regulation. At the national level, different institutions are in charge of antitrust and 
sector laws in most Member States. However, in some countries two institutions may 
apply the same legal instrument (like in the UK where competition law may be 
applied concurrently by OFCOM and the OFT), whereas other countries want to place 
the NRA in the competition authority. 
 
 
Table 2: Differences between SMP regime and competition law 
 
 Competition Law – Ex 
ante 
Competition Law – Ex 
post 
Sector Regulation 
                                                 
167 Access Notice, cited at note 39, para 15.  
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Objectives Maintain competition 
Increase competition 
Maintain competition 
Increase competition 
Increase competition 
Mimic competition 
Burden of proof 
to intervene 
Significant Lessening of 
Competition (low) 
Dominant 
Abuse (high) 
Market selection (very high) 
SMP=dominance (low) 
Remedies Mainly structural Mainly behavioural 
Fines, and damages 
Mainly behavioural 
Institutions Commission, 
NCAs 
Commission, NCAs, 
National Courts, (NRAs) 
 
NRAs, (NCAs) 
 
 
Therefore, even though antitrust and sector regulation tends to converge, some 
important divergences remain. The two main differences relate to the burden of proof 
to intervene and the institutions in charge. Because of the first divergence, sector 
regulation is particularly useful (and more efficient than antitrust) for markets needing 
on-going intervention168, i.e. the market fulfilling the three criteria identified by the 
Commission in its Recommendation on relevant market (high barriers to entry, 
absence of dynamic elements behind the barriers, and relative efficiency of sectoral 
remedies). 
 
Then we may ask whether in those market structures, competition law should also 
apply next to sector regulation? From a legal perspective, the answer is surely positive 
as antitrust apply across the broad and sector regulation does not remove its 
jurisdiction. From an efficiency perspective, the answer may be negative, with two 
caveats due to the second divergence between instruments (related to institutions). 
European antitrust should give precedence to national sector law solely if there is an 
effective intervention of the NRAs and if this intervention does not impede the 
achievement of the internal market. If one of these two conditions is not fulfilled, it 
may be appropriate for the Commission to take a case under its antitrust power and 
control NRAs actions. The competition practice under Article 82 EC seems to follow 
this rule, where Commission passed the case to the NRAs, and only pursued when 
NRAs could not intervene or was intervening unsatisfactorily. On the other hand, the 
more interventionist approach of the Commission under Merger Regulation and the 
multiple remedies imposed appears to be at odds with this rule. With a deeper 
analysis, that is not necessary the case as most of remedies imposed in the merger 
control were not available under the rigid 1998 regulatory framework. With the 
extended scope of the new regulatory framework and the increased possibility to rely 
on remedies under sector regulation, it is hoped that the use of remedies in merger 
control will decrease and that the cooperation between the Merger Department of the 
Commission and the NRAs will be enhanced169. 
 
To conclude, European legislation provides for an efficient balance between European 
(and national) competition law and national sector-specific regulation. If the NRA of 
each Member State uses their powers appropriately and in an harmonized way across 
Europe, the best possible deal will be delivered to the European consumers who could 
                                                 
168 See also the not so successful experience in New Zealand which relied exclusively on competition 
law to regulate telecoms until 2001, and then decided to enact a sector specific regulation: D. Geradin 
and M. Kerf, cited at note 166, Ch. 5; and the Final Report of the Ministerial Inquiry into 
Telecommunications, Sept. 2000, available at 
<http://www.teleinquiry.govt.nz/reports/final/index.html>. 
169 As in Commission Decision of 19 September 2003, Vodafone/SinglePoint, M. 3245, para 24. 
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enjoy the benefits of the so promising eSociety. Otherwise, regulatory costs will soar 
and other models will have to be invented. 
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ANNEX 
 
 
Table 1: Statistic of merger decisions 
 
Year 
 
Cases all sectors Cases electronic communications 
 Total With 
remedies 
Prohibiti
on 
Total With 
Remedies 
Prohibiti
on 
1990 7 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 60 6 1 1  0 0 
1992 61 7 0 3 0 0 
1993 57 2  0 3 0 0 
1994 91 4 1 6  0 1 
1995 109 6 2 13 0 2 
1996 125 3  3 13  1 0 
1997 142 9  1 15  1 0 
1998 238 16  2 26 2 2 
1999 270 27  1 28 5 0 
2000 345 40  2 57  9 1 
2001 340 23  5 43 2  0 
2002 274 15 0 17 1 0 
2003 231 17 0 11 2 0 
 
Total 
 
2350 
100% 
 
175 
7.5% 
 
18 
0.7% 
 
236 
100% 
 
23 
9.8% 
 
6 
2.5% 
 
 
This database covers 4 cases listed in I.64 NACE (Post and telecommunications), all cases 
I.64.20 (Telecommunications), and all cases O.92.20 (Radio and television activities). 
 
 
Source: DG Competition website 
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Table 2a: List of ex ante decisions with remedies (under Merger Regulation and Article 
81 EC) 
 
Case Date 
 
No Legal 
basis(*) 
Publication (**) Cat
*** 
Eirpage 18 Oct. 1991 32.737 81.3 EC O.J. [1991] L 306/23 2 
BT/MCI 27 July 1994 34.857 81.3 EC O.J. [1994] L 223/36 1 
Atlas 17 July 1996 35.337 81.3 EC O.J. [1996] L 239/23 1 
Phoenix/Global One 17 July1996 35.617 81.3 EC O.J. [1996] L 239/57 1 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol II 17 July 1996 M. 553 8.2 MR O.J. [1996] L 294/14 3 
BT/MCI (II) 14 May1997 M. 856 8.2 MR O.J. [1997] L 336/1 1 
Unisource 
Obligations repealed in 
Unisource (II) 
29 Oct. 1997 
 
29 Dec. 2000 
35.830 
 
36.841 
81.3 EC O.J. [1997] L 318/1 
 
O.J. [2001] L 52/30 
1 
Uniworld 29 Oct. 1997 35.738 81.3 EC O.J. [1997] L 318/24 1 
WorldCom/MCI 8 July 1998 M. 1069 8.2 MR O.J. [1999] L 116/1 1 
NC/Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmeri
ca  
3 Dec. 1998 M. 1327 6.2 MR  1 
BT/AT&T 30 March 1999 JV. 15 8.2 MR  1 
TPS 
Upheld in Metropole 
3 March 1999 
18 Sept. 2001 
36.237 
T-112/99 
81.3 EC O.J. [1999] L 90/6 
ECR [2001] II-2459 
3 
Cégétel+4 20 May 1999 36.592 81.3 EC O.J. [1999] L 218/14 1 
Vodafone/AirTouch 21 May 1999 M. 1430 6.2 MR  2 
AT&T/MediaOne 23 July 1999 M. 1551 6.2 MR  1 
Télécom Développement 27 July 1999 36.581 81 EC O.J. [1999] L 218/24 1 
BiB/Open 15 Sept. 1999 36.539 81.3 EC O.J. [1999] L 312/1 3 
Telia/Telenor 13 Oct. 1999 M. 1439 8.2 MR O.J. [2001] L 40/1 1 
Orange/Mannesmann 20 Dec. 1999 M. 1760 6.2 MR  2 
TelekomAustria/Libro 28 Feb. 2000 M. 1747 6.2 MR  1 
BSkyB/KirchPayTV 
Upheld in ARD 
21 March 2000 
30 Sept. 2003 
JV. 37 
T-158/00 
6.2 MR  
ECR [2003] II-XXX 
3 
BT/Esat 27 March 2000 M. 1838 6.2 MR  1 
EADS 11 April 2000 M. 1745 6.2 MR   
Vodafone/Mannesmann 12 April 2000 M. 1795 6.2 MR  2 
Vodafone/Vizzavi/Canal+ 20 July 2000 JV. 48 6.2 MR  3 
FranceTelecom/Orange 11 Aug. 2000 M. 2016 6.2 MR  2 
AOL/TimeWarner 11 Oct. 2000 M. 1845 8.2 MR O.J. [2001] L 268/28 3 
Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram 13 Oct. 2000 M. 2050 6.2 MR  3 
YLE/TDF/Digita 21 June 2001 M. 2300 6.2 MR  3 
Pirelli/Telecom Italia 
Modification remedies 
20 Sept. 2001 
5 Aug. 2002 
M. 2574 6.2 MR  
IP/02/1183 
1 
Telia/Sonera 10 July 2002 M. 2803 6.2 MR  1 
NewsCorp/Telepiù 2 April 2003 M. 2876 8.2 MR O.J. [2004] L 110/73 3 
DaimlerChrysler/DT 30 April 2003 M. 2903 8.2 MR O.J. [2003] L 300/62 3 
UK Network sharing 30 April 2003 38.370 81.3 EC O.J. [2003] L 200/59 2 
Network Sharing 
Rahmenvertrag 
Appeal pending 
16 July 2003 
 
T-328/03 
38.369 81.3 EC O.J. [2004] L 75/32 2 
Telenor/Canal+ 29 Dec. 2003 38.287 81.3 EC  3 
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Table 2b:   List of ex-ante decisions - prohibition 
 
Case Date 
 
No Legal 
basis 
Publication Cat 
MSG Media Service 9 November 1994 M. 469 8.3 MR O.J. [1994] L 364/1 3 
Nordic Satellite Distribution 19 July 1995 M. 490 8.3 MR O.J. [1996] L 53/20 3 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol (I) 
Upheld in appeal Endemol 
20 September 1995 
28 April 1999 
M. 553 
T-221/95 
8.3 MR O.J. [1996] L 134/32 
ECR [1999] II-1299 
3 
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere 
Appeal removed 
27 May 1998 M. 993 
T-123/98 
8.3 MR O.J. [1999] L 53/1 3 
Deutsche 
Telekom/BetaResearch 
27 May 1998 M. 1027 8.3 MR O.J. [1999] L 53/31 3 
MCIWorldCom/Sprint 
Appeal pending 
28 June 2000 M. 1741 
T-310/00 
8.3 MR O.J. [2003] L 300/1 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: List of ex-post decisions (Article 82 EC) 
 
Case Date 
 
No Legal 
basis 
Publication Cat 
British Telecom 
Upheld in appeal 
10 December 1982 
20 March 1985 
29.877 
41/83 
82 EC O.J. [1982] L 360/36 
ECR [1985] 873 
1 
Deutsche Telekom 
Appeal pending 
21 May 2003 37.451 
T-271/03 
82 EC O.J. [2003] L 263/9 1 
Wanadoo 
Appeal pending 
16 July 2003 38.233 
T-340/03 
82 EC IP/03/1026 1 
 
 
 
(*) 6.2 MR: Merger Regulation, Remedies in phase I 
     8.2 MR: Merger Regulation, Remedies in phase II 
     81.3 EC: EC Treaty, individual exemption 
 
(**) If no mention, the decision is published on the web site of DG Competition 
 
(***) Category 1: Fixed (incl. Internet or cable) or fixed and mobile services 
       Category 2: Mobile services 
       Category 3: Content-related services 
 
